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Visible minorities make up roughly half of the population in Metro Vancouver. Despite 
this, their representation in municipal governments is very low, in partial contrast to 
provincial and federal levels of government, where representation is higher, although still 
not proportionate. This study documents this underrepresentation at the municipal level, 
investigates the sources of that underrepresentation and examines policy options to 
address it. In five case studies, the research looks at the impact of at-large versus ward 
electoral systems, varying rates of voter turnout, and the influence of incumbency on 
electoral chances of visible minority candidates. Drawing on these case studies and six 
subject matter interviews, the study then evaluates four policy options in the Metro 
Vancouver context: changing to a ward system for elections, education campaigns, civic 
engagement opportunities and the status quo. 
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At-large Elections An electoral system where a political representative is 
elected to serve an entire area rather than one of its 
subdivisions. In the context of local governments, when a 
political representative is elected by electors from the 
entire city rather than from a subdivision.   
Descriptive 
Representation 
When the demographic characteristics of the represented 
are reflected in the representatives. 
Elections B.C. A non-partisan Office of the Legislature that administers 
provincial general elections, by-elections, recall petitions, 
initiative petitions, initiative votes, referenda, plebiscites 
and oversees campaign financing and advertising rules at 
the local government level in British Columbia. 
Incumbent Current holder of a political office or position. 
Local Government The administrative and legislative body of a municipality, 
county or district.  
Metro Vancouver A metropolitan area whose major urban centre is the City 
of Vancouver. Includes the Village of Anmore, Village of 
Belcarra, Bowen Island Municipality, City of Burnaby, City 
of Coquitlam, City of Delta, Electoral Area A, City of 
Langley, Township of Langley, Village of Lions Bay, City 
of Maple Ridge, City of New Westminster, City of North 
Vancouver, District of North Vancouver, City of Pitt 
Meadows, City of Port Coquitlam, City of Port Moody, 
City of Richmond, City of Surrey, Tsawwassen First 
Nation, City of Vancouver, District of West Vancouver, 
and City of White Rock. 
Substantive 
Representation 
The extent that representatives enact policies that are 
responsive to the needs or demands of the represented. 
Symbolic Representation The extent that representatives act as symbols or stand 
for something to the represented group.  
Visible Minority A person other than Aboriginal peoples, who are non-
Caucasian in race or non-white in colour. 




Chapter 1. Introduction 
Ethnic diversity has grown to become a valued piece of the Canadian identity. 
While early immigration was largely from Europe, the source countries of immigrants 
have expanded as Canada continues to rely on immigration. The Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms and the 1988 Canadian Multiculturalism Act codified Canada’s embrace of 
ethnic diversity. It is common to see Canadians of different ethnic origins represented in 
various sectors of life. However, one area where visible minority Canadians have made 
limited progress is the political sphere. While visible minority representation has 
progressed steadily at the federal level and in many provincial governments, there 
remains consistently low levels of visible minority representation at the municipal level. 
In the latest series of local government elections across Metro Vancouver in 
2018, visible minorities, who account for 48.9% of the total population of the region, 
made up 0% of the Mayors of municipalities in the region, and only 11% of the elected 
Councillors (McElroy, 2020). In the more populous and diverse cities in Metro 
Vancouver, where greater representation of visible minorities would be expected we see 
underrepresentation. 
According to the 2016 Census, 22.3% of the Canadian population were members 
of a visible minority community, and in the 2019 federal election, a record-setting 50 
visible minority candidates were elected as Members of Parliament, representing 14.8% 
of federal seats, a difference of 7.5 percentage points between the percentage of visible 
minorities in the total Canadian population. Provincially, in British Columbia (B.C.), 
30.3% of the population are visible minorities, while only 18.3% of elected members of 
the Legislative Assembly are visible minorities, a representation gap of 12 percentage 
points. While disparities exist federally and provincially, the representation gap widens 
as the government jurisdiction gets geographically smaller, from federal to provincial, 
down to local governments. Though previous research in B.C. focuses primarily on 
Vancouver (Aung, 2020), the representation gaps of visible minorities can be seen 
consistently throughout municipalities in the Metro Vancouver area. For example, 
Surrey, Burnaby, and Richmond, whose populations are all over 100,000 and visible 
minority population share is over 50%, have the largest representation gaps in Metro 
Vancouver.  
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The focus on the representativeness of local governments is an area of 
increasing academic study. Local government issues are increasingly rising in 
importance in the political discourse, as local governments, especially larger ones, are 
expanding their policy role by engaging in policy areas with implications for their 
increasingly diverse populations and playing greater advocacy roles (Bird, 2011). 
Municipal issues are rising on the political and policy agenda of Canadians, especially 
due to the population growth in urban centres and growing suburban communities 
surrounding larger cities. Additionally, shifting demographics of urban and suburban 
areas, specifically the increase in immigrant populations, is also a driving factor (Bird, 
2011). Municipal governments are often considered the gateway to political life, as the 
barriers to entry as a candidate tend to be lower (Bird, 2011). 
There are too few elected visible minorities in local governments across Metro 
Vancouver. Using case study comparisons of jurisdictions in Canada and the United 
States and informational interviews with current and previous municipal politicians, the 
findings of this analysis help inform choice of policy options to increase visible minorities 
representation in local governments. The advantages and disadvantages of these 
options are analyzed using a set of criteria and measures. Finally, recommendations are 
made. 
This paper will proceed in the following way: Chapter 2 will examine relevant 
background issues including the role and structure of local governments in Metro 
Vancouver, local government election administration, the importance of descriptive 
representation, and an overview of recent public debates and opinions. Chapter 3 will 
outline the methodology used for this research. Chapter 4 conducts a case study 
analysis of Long Beach, California; Calgary, Alberta; Seattle, Washington; Clarksville, 
Tennessee; and Saint Paul, Minnesota. Chapter 5 details the results of interviews 
conducted with current and former local government politicians in Metro Vancouver and 
the case study jurisdictions. Chapter 6 further dives into the themes that emerged from 
chapter 5 with a review of existing academic and grey literature. Chapter 7 presents the 
proposed policy options to address the lack of representation of visible minorities in local 
governments in Metro Vancouver. Chapter 8 lays out the criteria and measures by which 
the analysis of the proposed policy options will be conducted. Chapter 9 evaluates the 
policy options according to the criteria. Finally, Chapter 10 concludes with a discussion 
of research limitations and makes a policy recommendation. 
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Chapter 2. Background 
2.1. Why is Representation Important? 
At the heart of democracy is the idea of representative government: citizens elect 
representatives to act on their behalf in decision-making bodies. However, in many 
countries that are not ethnically homogenous and have high rates of immigration, a 
major challenge is ensuring that diverse voices are represented in the decision-making 
process. Unrepresentative governments are considered to be unjust, lack legitimacy, 
and reveal a democratic deficit (Childs and Cowley, 2011). In her book, The Concept of 
Representation, Hanna Pitkin examined four different views of political representation: 
formalistic representation, descriptive representation, symbolic representation, and 
substantive representation. The literature on high-quality representation tends to focus 
on the descriptive and substantive representation categories of representation. 
Pitkin’s first view is formalistic representation; it has two dimensions - 
authorization and accountability. The authorization view of formalistic representation 
focuses on the structure and procedures through which one gains power and authority to 
represent (Kurebwa, 2015). The accountability view of formalistic representation focuses 
on the ability of the represented to sanction or hold to account their representatives 
(Kurebwa, 2015). 
Pitkin’s second view of representation is symbolic representation. Symbolic 
representation is the extent that representatives act as symbols or stand for something 
to the represented group (Kurebwa, 2015). What the symbol is does not matter, what is 
more important is the symbol’s ability to evoke feelings of attitudes from the represented 
group (Kurebwa, 2015). 
The third view of representation Pitkin discusses is substantive representation. 
Substantive representation is achieved when the representative acts in the interests of 
those they represent, in a way that is responsive to those represented (Cellis, 2012). 
That is to say, it is when representatives enact policies that are responsive to the needs 
or demands of the represented. 
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The final view, on which this research will primarily focus, is descriptive 
representation. Descriptive representation is the extent to which the representatives look 
like or resemble the represented (Dovi, 2018). Primarily, descriptive representation 
focuses on whether or not demographic characteristics of the represented are reflected 
in the representatives.  
When it comes to the representation of minorities, democratic institutions are 
often faced with a perceived trade-off between substantive and descriptive 
representation. Is it more important to be concerned with the physical characteristics and 
ethnic makeup of the elected representatives of one’s government? Or should we be 
more concerned that marginalized people’s beliefs are being represented and acted 
upon through government action? While the two are not mutually exclusive, and 
substantive representation is something to strive for, this research will evaluate and 
focus on descriptive representation. 
Descriptive representation can have the additional bonus of symbolic 
representation. Research has shown positive links between descriptive representation 
and symbolic representation for marginalized and poorly represented communities 
(Hayes and Hibbing, 2017); the simple act of having an elected representative [who 
physically resembles members of a poorly represented community] can have a symbolic 
effect, allowing these communities a greater sense of empowerment (Hayes and 
Hibbing, 2017). Symbolic representation manifests in the short-term as a higher 
perception of procedural fairness, deeper satisfaction with decision-making processes, 
and support for government actors and actions (Hayes and Hibbing, 2017). In the long 
term, symbolic representation and descriptive representation can evolve into higher 
levels of trust in the government, greater perceptions of legitimacy, and greater interest  
and engagement in politics (Hayes and Hibbing, 2017). A study conducted in the United 
States on the benefits of descriptive and substantive representation found that at higher 
levels of descriptive representation, even when the policy outcomes (in this case, 
affirmative action policies that favoured Black constituents) were seen as favourable or 
not favourable, trust levels and perception of fairness in decision-making process for 
Black constituents were minimally impacted (Hayes and Hibbing, 2017). Perceived 
fairness was ranked on a scale of 0 to 1 and when Black decision makers accounted for 
25% of the decision-making body, the perceived fairness score of the favourable policy 
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outcome is 0.59 compared to 0.55 when the outcome is not favourable (Hayes and 
Hibbing, 2017).  
While substantive representation is something that governments should strive 
for, it does not consistently occur. Prior research conducted highlights that while elected 
representatives use perceptions of constituent preferences to inform their behaviour, 
these links are the strongest when issues are either salient, when elections are near, or 
when representatives view themselves as delegates rather than trustees (Hayes and 
Hibbing, 2017). This is to say, politicians may only reflect the policy interests of 
minorities under conditions where doing so is favourable for themselves, such as to 
garner support for elections, increase their own popularity or when the views of visible 
minorities do not conflict with the politician’s personal preference. However, in cases 
where descriptive representation overlaps with substantive representation, there are 
stronger effects. Research conducted in the United States shows that visible minority 
members of Congress (specifically African American members) are more likely than non-
visible minority Congress members to advance legislation and make speeches that 
attempt to enhance the material and cultural welfare of visible minority Americans. The 
study showed that being African American, independent of constituency characteristics 
or re-election maximization strategies, was the biggest driver for African American 
politicians to advance issues and sponsor bills of interest to their ethnic group (Baker 
and Cook, 2005). This includes the sponsoring or co-sponsoring of bills and programs 
that promote African American history or culture, support historically black organizations 
such as the NAACP, and promote the development of African American economic 
interests (Baker and Cook, 2005).  
2.2. The Extent of the Problem 
In Metro Vancouver, no municipality has more than two elected city officials who 
belong to a visible minority community. 12 out of 21 local governments have no visible 
minority representation whatsoever. Four of the 21 municipalities have one elected 
official, while only five out of 21 municipalities have two elected officials who are 
members of a visible minority community. Specifically, of the 155 City Councillors and 
Mayors elected throughout Metro Vancouver, only 14, or 9.03% belong to a visible 
minority community. 
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Illustrated below, Figure A shows the four smallest municipalities in Metro 
Vancouver, with populations under 4,000. While they have low levels of visible minority 
populations (with the exception of Anmore, having 22.17% of their population being 
visible minorities), there is no representation of visible minorities in their local 
governments. 
Figure A  Percentage of Visible Minorities in Small Metro Vancouver 
Municipalities Compared to the Percentage of Visible Minorities 
Elected to City Council in 2018 
 
Figure B shows municipalities in Metro Vancouver considered to be medium-
sized municipalities, each having populations between 18,000 and 86,000. As the 
population size increases, there are greater proportions of visible minorities; however, 
there are still low levels of visible minority representation in local governments. Notable 
exceptions include Maple Ridge, which has essentially proportionate representation, and 
New Westminster, whose proportion of visible minority representation differs by 9.76 
percentage points. All other cities in Figure B either have no visible minority 
representation in their local governments, or their representation gap is greater than 15 
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Figure B  Percentage of Visible Minorities in Medium Sized Metro Vancouver 
Municipalities Compared to the Percentage of Visible Minorities 
Elected to City Council in 2018 
 
However, the greatest gaps can be seen in Metro Vancouver’s largest cities, 
which also on average have the greatest portion of visible minorities. Figure C shows the 
seven most populous cities in Metro Vancouver, all having populations of over 100,000. 
Of note, throughout all Metro Vancouver municipalities, some of the greatest gaps in 
representation can be found in the cities where the visible minority population is greater 
than or equal to 50% of the total population. Particularly this is the case in Richmond, 
Vancouver, Burnaby, and Surrey, where the percentage point difference ranges from 
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Figure C  Percentage of Visible Minorities in Large Metro Vancouver 
Municipalities Compared to the Percentage of Visible Minorities 
Elected to City Council in 2018 
  
For a better comparison, Table 1 shows the cities in Metro Vancouver (sorted by 
total population) and shows the information in Figures A, B, and C, as well as the cities' 
total population, and the total population of visible minorities in the city. The discrepancy 
between the number of residents who are members of a visible minority community and 
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Table 1  Summary of Visible Minority Information in Metro Vancouver 
Municipalities 










Elected to City 
Council  
Vancouver 631,486 319,010 50.52% 9.09% 
Surrey 517,887 299,245 57.78% 22.22% 
Burnaby 232,755 146,310 62.86% 22.22% 
Richmond 198,309 150,015 75.65% 22.22% 
Coquitlam 139,284 69,270 49.73% 22.22% 
Township of 
Langley 
117,285 21,605 18.42% 0.00% 
Delta 102,238 36,300 35.51% 0.00% 
District of North 
Vancouver 
85,935 21,750 25.31% 0.00% 
Maple Ridge 82,256 12,115 14.73% 14.29% 
New 
Westminster 
70,996 27,210 38.33% 28.57% 
Port Coquitlam 58,612 18,785 32.05% 0.00% 
City of North 
Vancouver 
52,898 16,340 30.89% 14.29% 
District of West 
Vancouver 
42,473 15,155 35.68% 14.29% 
Port Moody 33,551 10,185 30.36% 0.00% 
City of Langley 25,888 3,500 13.52% 0.00% 
White Rock 19,952 3,135 15.71% 0.00% 
Pitt Meadows 18,573 3,485 18.76% 0.00% 
Bowen Island 3,680 240 6.52% 0.00% 
Village of 
Anmore 
2,210 490 22.17% 0.00% 
Lions Bay 1,334 135 10.12% 0.00% 
Village of 
Belcarra 
643 60 9.33% 0.00% 
*Data taken from Statistics Canada 2016 Census and individual municipality websites 
2.3. Possible Explanations as to Why Representation is 
Low in Municipalities 
While there has been much research in Canada on diversity in municipal politics, 
particularly in Ontario (Bird, 2011; Siemiatycki, 2011), there has been very little research 
conducted in Metro Vancouver. There is one study that focuses on the representation of 
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women and visible minorities in Vancouver City Council (Aung, 2020). Aung tests to see 
if local political party elites discourage visible minorities from obtaining candidacy, if 
underrepresentation is caused by a lack of “qualified” visible minorities candidates (here 
“qualified” is defined as candidates who have favourable socioeconomic, and political 
backgrounds), and if the socioeconomic and political backgrounds of visible minority 
candidates disadvantage them (Aung, 2020). Results indicate that members of visible 
minority communities in Vancouver do face barriers to being recruited or active in 
municipal political parties, including not being a part of traditional recruitment networks 
nor actively being sought after by local party recruitment officials (Aung, 2020). Aung 
also found that visible minority candidates in Vancouver had weaker social, and 
economic backgrounds compared to non-visible minority candidates. They were more 
likely to have nonprofessional and unskilled occupations compared to white candidates 
by 12 percentage points, and less likely to reside in affluent neighbourhoods than white 
candidates by 19 percentage points. Common barriers faced by visible minority 
candidates include a lack of financial resources, time availability, name recognition, and 
not belonging to a party’s sociopolitical network (Aung, 2020).  
Looking outside of Metro Vancouver for possible explanations, research on 23 
local governments across Ontario found that they suffer from underrepresentation of 
visible minorities, especially when compared to provincial and federal levels of 
government. In these 23 municipalities, visible minorities, who accounted for 32% of the 
population, held 7.6% of council seats (Bird, 2011). For comparison, during the same 
time period, visible minorities accounted for 12.1% of the elected members of the 
provincial parliament, and 17.1% of the 47 Greater Toronto ridings in federal parliament 
(Bird, 2011). In the research, Bird concludes that while in certain municipalities, a lack of 
visible minority candidates played a role in their underrepresentation, there were also 
other factors at play (Bird, 2011). Bird’s research shows that voter bias through ethnic 
affinity bias plays a role. Voters prefer same-ethnicity candidates over different-ethnicity 
candidates, going so far as to prefer a candidate with the same ethnicity over candidates 
who are likely to work for the broad interests of the entire city and speak for the elector’s 
interests (Bird, 2011). Bird also explains municipal elections occur in a low information 
context, with limited media coverage focusing primarily on the front runner candidates 
(Bird, 2011). Visible minorities candidates suffer in this low information context, 
especially with the lack of formalized party organizations. Party organizations, which are 
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typically found at the provincial and federal level, are able to supplement low information 
by advertising their candidates to electors, and providing other important electoral 
information and reminders (Bird, 2011).  Bird also highlights that local government 
elections see lower rates of voter turnout with less representative voter bases of a city’s 
population (Bird, 2011). While these issues may arise from research conducted in 
Ontario, they act as potential explanations for Metro Vancouver as well, with the 
exception of the lack of party structure, which is prevalent in many Metro Vancouver 
municipalities, to be discussed later in this chapter. 
Research looking into the under-representation of visible minorities in Ontario 
shows that representation gaps for visible minorities at the local government level can be 
attributed not only to the lack of political parties but also to time and resource-intensive 
campaigns at the municipal level (Siemiatycki, 2011). Successful municipal campaigns 
require candidates to have disposable time and financial support, and the requirements 
are more burdensome at the municipal level than the provincial or federal level due to 
the lack of support mechanism for candidates at the local level (Siemiatycki, 2011). Due 
to these reasons, and the reality that local governments are less understood and 
appreciated, ambitious visible minority candidates are more likely to seek provincial or 
federal office (Siemiatycki, 2011). 
Researchers have also outlined the conditions under which visible minorities are 
more likely to succeed in politics. These conditions include electoral contests with 
smaller electoral districts, electoral contests in districts with concentrated groups of 
electors with similar demographic characteristics, or electoral contests where they are 
associated with a political party (Andrew et al., 2008). 
2.3.1. Incumbency and Previous Experience Factor 
Due to the scale and lack of media coverage on local governments, incumbents 
and those who have held office at other government levels have a distinct advantage 
over newer candidates (Bird, 2011). Research from municipalities in California shows 
that those who currently hold office in local government are more likely to run in the next 
election, as winning the previous election increased their odds of re-running by 39 
percentage points (Trounstine, 2011). The same research shows that incumbents are 32 
percentage points more likely to win in a local government election compared to non-
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incumbents, and on average increased their share of the vote by 22 percentage points 
relative to their first electoral victory (Trounstine, 2011). These individuals are known 
quantities; they have the political capital, name recognition, and receive more media 
coverage. 
Table 2  Select Metro Vancouver Municipalities and Elected Officials with 
Prior Experience 
Municipality Does the Mayor have prior 
experience 
Percentage of City Councillors with Prior 
Experience 

















*Data taken from Civic Info BC, 2018 Candidates and Results 
As seen in Table 2, of the seven largest municipalities in Metro Vancouver, five 
municipalities elected Mayors who had prior governance experience (defined as serving 
as the incumbent, or having served previously as an elected official at the municipal 
level, or another level of government). Six of the seven large municipalities elected city 
councils where at least 50% Councillors had prior governance experience. Table 3 
further shows that in all but one large municipality (the City of Surrey), incumbents and 
candidates with prior governance experience won in larger percentages than non-
incumbents and candidates with no governance experience. Appendix A further breaks 
down the winning percentage of incumbents and candidates with prior governance 
experience in the council and mayoral elections Metro Vancouver’s seven large 
municipalities. 
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Table 3  The Winning Percentage of Incumbents and Candidates with Prior 
Governance Experience Compared to Candidates with No 
Governance Experience 
City Number of Candidates with Previous 
Governance Experience Elected / 
Number of Candidates with Previous 
Governance Experience  
Number of Candidates without Previous 
Governance Experience Elected / 
Number of Candidates without Previous 
Governance Experience  
Surrey 16.67% 16.67% 
Vancouver 35.71% 8.77% 
Richmond 60% 10% 
Burnaby 77.78% 14.29% 
Coquitlam 100% 15.38% 




*Data taken from Civic Info BC, 2018 Candidates and Results 
These tables show that indeed incumbents and candidates with prior governance 
experience hold a greater electoral advantage in municipal elections as compared to 
non-incumbent candidates with no governance experience.  
2.4. Local Governments 
Local governments in B.C. provide services and governance to approximately 
89% of the province’s population (Government of British Columbia, n.d.). Councils have 
the authority to create bylaws, regulate, prohibit, or impose requirements on various 
areas including land use, fire and policing services, and various other municipal 
services. There are 162 municipalities in B.C., classified as either towns, villages, 
districts, or cities depending on their population and geographic area. Local 
governments are known as creatures of the province, meaning that they are set up and 
empowered by provincial legislation. In B.C. the two fundamental pieces of provincial 
legislation that govern local governments are the Local Government Act and the 
Community Charter. Notably, the City of Vancouver also has its own Vancouver Charter, 
provincial legislation that makes specific provisions of the Community Charter and the 
Local Government Act apply to Vancouver, and makes specific provisions for 
Vancouver, many of which are parallel powers to other municipalities (Government of 
British Columbia, n.d.). 
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2.4.1. Method and Ballots 
Elections for City Councillor in Metro Vancouver municipalities are conducted at-
large and utilize block voting. Block voting is a variant of first-past-the-post, and acts as 
a pseudo form of ranked ballot, where each elector is given as many votes as there are 
positions to be filled. Electors are only able to use one vote per candidate and are free to 
cast as many or as few of the allotted number of votes as they wish. Under the block 
system used by municipalities in Metro Vancouver, electors may vote for any candidate, 
including candidates from different parties or slates. Municipal elections are fixed-date 
elections and are conducted every four years on the third Saturday of October. 
2.4.2. Parties and Slates 
Candidates are allowed to run under party banners or form slates in municipal 
elections across Metro Vancouver. Parties are known as Elector Organizations, and they 
have a unique set of rules governing their actions at the local level. Elector organizations 
can be incorporated or unincorporated organizations and may endorse a candidate(s) in 
an election and have that endorsement included on the ballot. In order to do so, the 
organization must fill out the appropriate paperwork, including written consent from the 
candidate. The organization must have a membership of at least 50 electors in the 
municipality where the election is being held.  
Civic Parties and Slates are commonplace in Metro Vancouver. The impact of 
slates and municipal political parties in five of the seven largest municipalities in Metro 
Vancouver are observed below for the 2018 elections.  
City of Surrey  
Of the eight candidates for Mayor, six ran as part of an electoral organization, 
and the elected Mayor was part of an electoral organization. Of the 48 city council 
candidates, 36 ran as members of an electoral organization, and all eight elected 
Councillors were members of an electoral organization. In the 2018 election, there were 
a total of eight electoral organizations (Safe Surrey Coalition, Surrey First Electors 
Society, Integrity Now, Proudly Surrey, People First, Progressive Sustainable, 
Greenvote and Independent Surrey). Of the 42 candidates who ran under a civic party or 
slate, 20 or 47.62% of the candidates were members of a visible minority community, 
15 
with four being mayoral candidates and 16 being Councillor candidates. Of the visible 
minority candidates who belong to a civic party or slate, 12.5% were elected to city 
council, compared to 30% of their non-visible minority counterparts. 
City of Vancouver 
Of the 21 mayoral candidates, six ran as part of an electoral organization, and 
while the winner did not, he had previously served as a federal Member of Parliament for 
seven years. Of the 71 City Councillor candidates, 44 ran as part of an electoral 
organization. All 10 elected City Councillors belonged to electoral organizations. In the 
2018 election, there were a total of nine electoral organizations (Green Party of 
Vancouver, Non-partisan Association (NPA), Coalition of Progressive Electors (COPE), 
OneCity, Vision Vancouver, Vancouver 1st, Coalition Vancouver, Yes Vancouver and 
ProVancouver). Of the 50 candidates who ran under a civic party or slate, 25 or 50% of 
the candidates were members of a visible minority community, with four being mayoral 
candidates, and 21 being Councillor candidates. Of the candidates who belong to a civic 
party or slate, 4.76% of the visible minority candidates for Councillors were elected, and 
39.13% of non-visible minority candidates were elected as City Councillors. 
City of Richmond 
Of the six mayoral candidates, none were members of an electoral organization. 
Of the 30 City Councillor candidates, 19 were members of an electoral organization and 
seven of the eight elected members of council belonged to an electoral organization. In 
the 2018 election, there were a total of four electoral organizations (RITE Richmond, 
Richmond Citizens’ Association, Richmond Community Coalition, Richmond First). Of 
the 19 candidates who ran under a civic party or slate, nine or 47.37% were members of 
a visible minority community, all seeking Councillor positions. Of the candidates who 
belong to a civic party or slate, 11.11% of the visible minority candidates for Councillor 
were elected, whereas 60% of non-visible minority candidates were elected. 
City of Burnaby 
Of the four mayoral candidates, one was a member of an electoral organization, 
however, the elected mayor was not. Of the 23 city council candidates, 20 were 
members of electoral organizations, and all of the elected members of council belonged 
to an electoral organization. In the 2018 election, there were a total of three electoral 
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organizations (Burnaby Citizens Association, Burnaby Green Party, and Burnaby First 
Coalition). Of the 21 candidates who ran under a civic party or slate, eight were 
members of a visible minority, all seeking the Councillor positions. Of the candidates 
who belong to a civic party or slate, 25% of the visible minority candidates for Councillor 
were elected, whereas 50% of the non-visible minority candidates were elected.  
City of Delta 
Of the six mayoral candidates, three were members of an electoral organization, 
and the elected Mayor was part of an electoral organization. Of the 20 City Councillor 
candidates, 14 belonged to an electoral organization, and all six elected Councillors 
belonged to an electoral organization. In the 2018 election, there were a total of three 
electoral organizations (Achieving For Delta, Independents Working for You, and Team 
Delta). Of the 17 candidates who ran under a civic party or slate, three were members of 
a visible minority community, all of whom were running as Councillors. Of the candidates 
who belong to a civic party or slate, none of the visible minority candidates were elected 
as Councillors, while 54.55% of the non-visible minority candidates were elected as 
Councillors.  
As can be seen above, the impacts of civic parties can vary from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction. What is evident is that although visible minority candidates are supported by 
some electoral organizations, they are not winning at the same rate as their non-visible 
minority counterparts.  
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2.4.3. Candidate Eligibility 
Table 4  Supply of Visible Minority Candidates in Local Elections of Large 
Metro Vancouver Municipalities, 2018 

























Surrey 56 28 50% 57.78% 22.22% 
Vancouver 92 36 39.13% 50.52% 9.09% 
Richmond 36 17 47.22% 75.65% 22.22% 
Burnaby 27 9 33.33% 62.86% 22.22% 
Coquitlam 22 4 18.18% 49.73 22.22% 
Delta 26 5 19.23% 35.51% 0.00% 
Township 
of Langley 
26 2 7.69% 18.42% 0.00% 
 
Table 4 shows the supply of visible minority candidates in the local government 
elections of the large municipalities in Metro Vancouver in 2018, along with the 
percentage of visible minorities in the city. As can be seen, the percentage of visible 
minority candidates in these cities is smaller than their share of the population. After an 
examination of the candidate eligibility requirements, it can be concluded that there are 
no formal regulations that act as discriminatory barriers that would limit the participation 
of potential visible minority candidates. A cursory glance of the limits beyond being an 
eligible elector and citizen can be found below. 
In order to run as a candidate for municipal office, potential candidates must 
meet certain eligibility requirements. According to the Local Government Act, candidates 
must be nominated by at least two qualified nominators of the municipality, or electoral 
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area for which the nomination is made, or by the minimum number stipulated by a bylaw, 
if one exists, in the municipality they intend to run in. According to the Local Government 
Act, municipalities are able to set the bylaws for the minimum number of qualified 
nominators to either 10 or 25 for a municipality with a population of 5,000 or more, or 10 
if the municipality has a population of less than 5,000. For the scope of this research, no 
municipality in Metro Vancouver has less than 5,000 qualified electors. In order to be 
qualified as a nominator, an individual must be qualified as an elector of the municipality 
for which the nomination is made, and in the case of a neighbourhood-specific position, 
must be qualified as an elector for that position.  
Local governments are able to enact bylaws that require a candidate seeking 
nomination for an elected position to make a nomination deposit; the Local Government 
Act does not allow for bylaws to seek deposits greater than $100. All deposits are held 
by the Chief Electoral Officer of the municipality. Deposits are returned to the individual if 
they are either not successful in being declared a candidate, if they are declared a 
candidate and successfully fill out the candidate disclosure statement, or if they are 
declared a candidate and they through a court order are not required to fill out a 
candidate disclosure statement. In all other cases, the deposit is forfeited and paid to the 
local government.  
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Chapter 3. Methodology 
This chapter outlines the methodology utilized to examine the identified policy 
problem and help inform policy analysis. The primary methodology used is a case study 
comparison using an in-depth analysis of municipal government electoral administration, 
and city council and mayoral composition to better understand why some municipalities 
have greater representation of visible minorities, and what helps to facilitate this. Further, 
six expert interviews were conducted with current and former municipal politicians, in 
order to determine key rationale, barriers and best practices to increase representation 
in government. 
Case studies were conducted in five jurisdictions: Calgary, Alberta; Clarksville, 
Tennessee; Long Beach, California; Saint Paul, Minnesota; and Seattle, Washington. 
These jurisdictions were selected as they all have proportionate or close to proportionate 
representation of visible minorities reflected in their city councils. Case studies will 
provide background information on the city, such as demographic information, outline 
the city council history and structure, the breakdown of visible minority representation on 
council, the jurisdictions’ electoral administration, voter turnout, and the impact of 
incumbency on elections. 
For the expert interviews, current and former elected city council officials 
belonging to visible minority communities in both Metro Vancouver and other major 
municipalities across North America (including case study cities) were approached to 
participate. Current City Councillors were approached via their official city council email, 
while former City Councillors were approached via email in the public domain. Former 
city council candidates from visible minority communities in Metro Vancouver were also 
approached to participate in interviews using emails found in the public domain. Due to 
difficulties in locating contact information for former city council officials and former 
candidates, as well as time constraints and a lack of responses, only six interviews were 
conducted. Interviews were semi-structured and covered themes such as barriers visible 
minorities face entering and seeking election at the local level, the local electoral 
administration system, if visible minority representation impacts policy at the local level, 
voter turnout at the local level, the local political knowledge, and engagement.  
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3.1. Limitations 
There are a number of limitations and constraints in this research that need to be 
addressed. First, there are certain subjects outside of the scope of the research that 
should be considered for further research. This includes the impact of parties and slates 
in local government elections, which is briefly touched on in Chapter 2, as well as the 
role of campaign financing, as it has been established that local government campaigns 
are financially demanding.  
The second limitation is related to the case study jurisdictions. There was a 
difficulty in finding municipalities that have implemented specific programs in order to 
increase the elected representation of minority groups. Therefore, case study 
jurisdictions were selected based on the representation ratio of visible minorities in their 
local government. The case studies, therefore, act more as community profiles, 
chronicling and interpreting data instead of policies. This makes the case studies less 
fruitful than originally anticipated. 
The third limitation is in the selection process and the results of the interviews. As 
mentioned earlier, expert interviews were conducted with visible minority politicians or 
former candidates at the municipal level. The pool of prospective candidates was taken 
from Metro Vancouver, as well as the case study jurisdictions. However, there was 
difficulty in finding the contact information for previously elected politicians, and former 
candidates. Also, there is an inherent self-selection bias in the sample of interviewees, 
as those who participated in the interviews are more likely to believe that visible minority 
representation is important in government. Although it cannot be said that those who did 
not reply or were unavailable to participate in interviews were not necessarily interested 
or did not believe in the importance of visible minority representation, we can say that 
respondents are more likely to be interested and invested in the topic if they agreed to 
an interview.   
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Chapter 4. Case Studies 
In this chapter, five jurisdictions are examined to determine the impact of the 
electoral system, voter turnout and incumbency on the representation of visible 
minorities in local governments. Background information such as a breakdown of 
demographics of each jurisdiction, historical background of the local government and a 
breakdown of visible minority representation of the current and previous city councils is 
done to provide important context to each jurisdiction. A summary of insights gained 
from the case studies can be found at the end of this chapter. 
4.1. Case Study 1 – Calgary  
4.1.1. Demographics 
Table 5  Demographics: Calgary, Alberta, Canada 
 2016 Census 2011 Census 
South Asian 115,795 81,180 
Chinese 87,835 74,070 
Filipino 67,650 47,350 
Black  51,515 31,870 
Total Visible Minority 
Population 
442,585 325,390 
Visible Minority Percentage of 
Total Population 
36.21% 30.07% 
Total Populations 1,222,405 1,082,235 
*Data Taken From Statistics Canada 2016 and 2011 Census 
According to Statistics Canada’s 2016 Census, the population of Calgary is 
1,222,405. As can be seen in Table 5, the total visible minority population is 442,585, or 
roughly 36.21% of the total population of Calgary. Table 5 also shows the largest 
subgroups of visible minorities in Calgary, using the same terms tracked by Statistics 
Canada. South Asians make up the largest proportion of Calgary’s visible minority 
population, at 115,795, followed by Chinese at 87,835, Filipino at 67,650, and Black at 
51,515. In comparison to the 2011 Census, the population of visible minorities has 
increased from 325,390, as has the population share of visible minorities, from 30.07%, 
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increasing by 6.14 percentage points. Table 5 also shows that all of the selected 
subgroup populations of visible minorities have grown as well.  
4.1.2. Background on City Council Structure 
Currently, Calgary city council consists of 14 Councillors who are in one of the 14 
wards and a Mayor who is elected at-large. In 1894 when Calgary became a city, the 
municipal government consisted of nine aldermen elected from three wards (City of 
Calgary, n.d.-a). In 1906 a fourth ward was added with three new aldermen positions 
(City of Calgary, n.d.-a). The ward system was temporarily not used from 1914 to 1960 
when the city switched to an at-large election. During that time, aldermen were elected 
for a two-year term. In 1960 a city plebiscite re-introduced the ward system. The city had 
six wards with two aldermen from each ward. In 1976 the total amount of wards was 
increased to 14 and the city had 14 aldermen. In 2013, the term alderman was replaced 
with Councillors, and their term limit was increased from three years to four.  
The City of Calgary is a municipal corporation with a council-manager 
government structure. The Mayor and Councillors oversee the City Manager and the 
administration of the city together. Calgary’s city council is a council-policy committee 
system, where the council establishes its policies for governing the city based on 
information provided by four standing policy committees: planning and urban 
development, transportation and transit, utilities and corporate services, and community 
and protective services. The Municipal Government Act, city bylaws and the Calgary 
Charter empower and provide the framework for the City of Calgary’s municipal 
government.  
4.1.3. Elections  
As mentioned above, the Mayor is elected through a citywide vote, while 
Councillors are elected by the constituents of their wards. Elections, which are regulated 
by the Local Authorities Election Act, are fixed-date, taking place on the third Monday of 
October every four years. Elections are overseen locally by Elections Calgary. The 
election is conducted under a first-past-the-post ballot.  
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The Municipal Government Act also lays out the requirement for cities to have 
wards, and that wards should be kept and adjusted in order to ensure they have an 
approximately equal number of electors, and that bylaws can enable the adjustment of 
wards. Even though Councillors are elected from wards, a city bylaw states that they are 
to act as Councillors for the whole municipality. City Councillors and the Mayor used to 
serve three-year terms, however, an amendment to Alberta’s Local Authorities Election 
Act increased the term length to four years. 
4.1.4. Representation Breakdown City and City Council  
In terms of visible minority representation on city council, of the 14 wards, three 
are represented by visible minorities, and Calgary’s Mayor is a member of a visible 
minority community. This is a representation ratio of 26.67% (4 of 15 positions), and 
when compared to the visible minority share of the population, which as of the 2016 
census was 36.2%, there appears to be a small gap. However, Calgary is one of the few 
Canadian cities with a Mayor who is a visible minority having won three consecutive 
elections (2010, 2013 and 2017). What is further interesting about Calgary is that since 
the Mayor’s first win in 2010, in each successive election, the number of visible 
minorities has increased, while in the prior election of 2007, no elected members of city 
council were visible minorities.  
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Figure D  Percentage of Visible Minorities in Calgary Compared to Percentage 
of Visible Minorities Elected to Calgary City Council, 2007-2017 
 
Figure D shows this phenomenon and compares the percentage of visible 
minorities in Calgary to the percentage of visible minorities elected to Calgary city 
council. The mayor may have acted as a symbol, encouraging other visible minorities to 
run. Further, his election may have made the overall electorate more comfortable with 
electing members of visible minorities, and, as is described in the voter turnout section 
below, may have increased the participation rates of visible minorities voting.  
4.1.5. Voter Turnout 
According to Elections Calgary, 387,583 votes were cast in the 2017 municipal 
election, totalling 58.1% voter turnout (Calgary, n.d.-c). In the 2013 municipal election, 
263, 336 votes were cast, approximately 39.4% voter turnout (Calgary, n.d.-b). In the 
2010 municipal election, 354,356 votes were cast, approximately 53.3% voter turnout, 
and in 2007, turnout was 32.9%, with 210,597 votes cast (Calgary, n.d.-b). It is important 
to note that overall, turnout is higher than typical municipal elections in comparison to 
Metro Vancouver. In 2017, when the turnout was at its highest in our observed period, 
















Calgary 2007 Calgary 2010 Calgary 2013 Calgary 2017
Percentage of Visible Minority (closest census year)
Percentage of visible minority elected to city council
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4.1.6. Incumbency Effect 
Table 6  Incumbents Running in Previous Electoral Contests in Calgary, 
Alberta, Canada 











2017 15 10 10 100% 
2013 15 13 11 84.62% 
2010 15 9 8 88.89% 
 
In the 2017 election, of the 15 positions up for election, 10 electoral contests saw 
incumbents run. Of the 10 races where incumbents ran, they won in all of them. In these 
cases, incumbents won by seven percentage points, 12 percentage points, 13 
percentage points, seven percentage points, three percentage points, 25 percentage 
points, eight percentage points, 61 percentage points, 18 percentage points, and 80 
percentage points. On average, incumbents won by a margin of 23.4 percentage points. 
In the 2013 election, of the 15 positions up for election, 13 electoral contests saw 
incumbents run. Of those 13 contests, incumbents won 11, or 84.6% of the contests. In 
these cases, incumbents won by 53 percentage points, 62 percentage points, 59 
percentage points, 14 percentage points, nine percentage points, 22 percentage points, 
78 percentage points, six percentage points, 42 percentage points, 26 percentage points 
and 34 percentage points. The two races the incumbents lost, were lost by a difference 
of three percentage points, and eight percentage points. On average, incumbents won 
by a margin of 36.82 percentage points, whereas they lost by an average margin of 5.5 
percentage points.  
In the 2010 election, of the 15 positions up for election, nine electoral contests 
saw incumbents run. Of those nine contests, incumbents won eight, or 88.9% of 
contests. In these cases, incumbents won by 16 percentage points, five percentage 
points, 40 percentage points, 47 percentage points, five percentage points, 12 
percentage points, 68 percentage points, four percentage points, and 24 percentage 
points. In the race where the incumbent lost, they lost by a margin of 11 percentage 
points. On average, incumbents won by a margin of 27.63 percentage points.  
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By observing the trend over the past three elections in Calgary, 32 of the 45 
electoral contests, or 71.1%, saw incumbents run. Of those 32 electoral contests, 
incumbents won 29 contests or 90.6% of those contests. Looking at the 45 electoral 
contests that occurred over the past three elections, incumbents won 64.4% of the 
contests. Therefore, it holds true in Calgary that incumbents have a greater chance of 
winning electoral contests.  
4.2. Case Study 2 – Clarksville 
4.2.1. Demographics 
Table 7  Demographics: Clarksville, Tennessee, USA 
 2019 Population Estimates 2010 Census 
Non-Hispanic Whites 56.7% 61.1% 
“Black or African American 
Alone” 
24.3% 23.2% 
“Asian Alone” 2.5% 2.3% 
“Hispanic” 11.5% 9.3% 
“American Indian and Alaska 
Native”  
0.7% 0.6% 
Calculated Visible Minority 
Percentage 
42.6% 38.3% 
Total Population 158,146 132,929 
*Data Taken From United States Census Bureau 
Table 7 shows the latest population estimates from July 1, 2019, and data from 
the 2010 Census, as collected by the United States Census Bureau. The table compares 
visible minority percentage and the share of the population of a significant visible 
minority and non-visible minority sub-groups, as identified by the United States Census 
Bureau. As the table shows, Clarksville is still predominantly populated by non-Hispanic 
whites, who account for over 50% of the population. From 2010 to 2019, the visible 
minority population has increased by 4.3 percentage points and currently accounts for 
42.6% of the total population. The largest visible minority subgroup is “Black or African 
American” accounting for 24.3% of the current population. 
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4.2.2. Background on City Council Structure 
The City of Clarksville was founded in 1785 and incorporated in 1807. In 1907, 
Clarksville gained legislative approval to adopt a board of commission form of 
government, who were elected at-large (Buchanan v. City of Jackson, Tenn., 683 F. 
Supp. 1515). This was done to disenfranchise African American voters, who at the time, 
accounted for an equal proportion of the population as White voters (United States 
Department of the Interior National Park Service, n.d.). In 1907, Nace Dixon, a Black 
Republican city council member actively campaigned to eliminate saloons in the city, 
which led to a local referendum, where saloons were eliminated, and the City voted to 
create a new charter (United States Department of the Interior National Park Service, 
n.d.). The Democratic Party at the time, leading the effort to disenfranchise Black voters, 
added an amendment to the new city charter eliminating the ward-based voting system 
in favour of at-large city elections. Democrats alleged the change was necessary for the 
anti-saloon campaign, but with the covert purpose of eliminating black political power 
(United States Department of the Interior National Park Service, n.d.). 
In 1990, the Clarksville-Montgomery County Citizens for Fair Government, 
launched a petition to the state Legislature to push for a referendum to change the at-
large system to a ward system. The group’s petition cited the at-large system as 
violating the Voting Rights Act and diluting the votes of minorities (Scott, 1995). At this 
point in time, Clarksville’s at-large electoral system had wards, however, the candidates 
were still elected at-large through the entire city, meaning that even if a candidate lost 
the vote within their ward, if they garnered enough support outside of the ward, they 
could still be elected (Scott, 1995). The Citizens for Fair Government group also filed a 
federal civil rights lawsuit against Clarksville and the Montgomery County Election 
Commission, challenging the at-large system. After a successful referendum in 1991, at-
large voting was scrapped for ward voting, and the lawsuit against the city was dropped 
(Scott, 1995). 
Currently, Clarksville City Council elects 12 City Councillors from one of 12 
wards, with one Councillor elected per ward and a Mayor elected at-large (State of 
Tennessee, n.d.). The City Charter specifies that the wards should represent 
substantially equal populations, and the council may reapportion the districts at any time 
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if deemed necessary solely for maintaining substantially equal representation based on 
population, using federal census data as a source (State of Tennessee, n.d.). 
Through the City Charter, Clarksville City Council is also empowered to supply, 
regulate or contract services and licenses, collect and levy taxes, establish and maintain 
fire services, construct and maintain roads and sidewalks, as well as any power to 
promote or protect the safety, health, peace, security, good order, comfort, convenience, 
moral and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants (State of Tennessee, n.d.). The 
Mayor acts as the chief executive of the municipal government and is responsible for the 
administration of the City’s affairs. The Mayor presides over city council meetings, and 
has “a seat, a voice and the right to vote”. The Mayor is also able to introduce 
ordinances and resolutions for action by city council. The Mayor also has veto power of 
city council ordinances. The city council is able to override the mayoral veto by voting to 
do so with a simple majority. 
The City of Clarksville has imposed term limits on City Councillors and Mayors, 
limiting them to being able to serve a maximum of three consecutive terms (State of 
Tennessee, n.d.). Should a City Councillor have reached their term limit, should they 
want to, they are eligible to run for Mayor, whereas Mayors who have reached their term 
limit are prohibited from running for a City Councillor position (State of Tennessee, n.d.). 
4.2.3. Elections 
Municipal elections are conducted by the Montgomery County Election 
Commission. Elections are held on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November 
in each even-numbered year in order to fill vacancies or should there be no vacancies, 
after the conclusion of the Councillor and Mayor’s four-year term. Currently, Councillor 
elections are staggered. The 2020 election saw elections for Wards 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 11 and 
12, and the 2018 election contested Wards 1, 2, 6, 7, 10, 11 and the at-large Mayor 
position. 
4.2.4. Representation Breakdown City and City Council  
In terms of representation on city council, after the 2020 election of Wards 3, 4, 
5, 8, 9, 11 and 12, of the 13 elected positions on city council (Mayor and 12 Councillors), 
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six are members of a visible minority community, accounting for 50% of the Councillors. 
After including the Mayor, who is not a member of a visible minority community, visible 
minorities account for six of 13 elected city council positions or 46.15% of elected city 
council positions. This has been trending upwards as, after the 2018 elections of the 
Mayor, Wards 1, 2, 6, 7, 10 and 11, five of 13 members of city council, or 38.46% of 
council were members of visible minority communities. In 2016, after the election of 
Wards 3, 4, 5, 8, 9 and 12, four of 13 elected city council positions were held by visible 
minorities or 30.76% of city council. 
Figure E  Percentage of Visible Minorities in Clarksville Compared to the 
Percentage of Visible Minorities Elected to Clarksville City Council, 
2016-2020 
 
Figure E compares the percentage of visible minorities in Clarksville (using the 
closest demographic data at the time of the election) to the percentage of visible 
minorities elected to city council from 2016 to 2020. As the figure shows, after both the 
2018 and 2020 elections, the proportion of visible minorities elected to city council was 
near identical or in the case of 2020, slightly greater, than their corresponding 
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4.2.5. Voter Turnout 
The 2020 city election, where seven wards were up for election, ran concurrently 
with state and the federal presidential election. While there were a total of 131,378 
registered voters and turnout overall was 58.64%, only 28,164 ballots were cast for the 
city council positions, a turnout of 21.43% (Montgomery County Election Commission 
2020). The 2018 elections coincided with state elections. There were 109,794 registered 
voters and voter turnout was 47.77%, however only 14,909 ballots were cast for 
Councillor positions (13.58% voter turnout), and 33,812 ballots were cast for Mayor 
(30.79% voter turnout) (Montgomery County Election Commission, 2018). The 2016 city 
election ran concurrently with the state and federal presidential election. While there 
were 108,538 registered voters, and voter turnout was 53.70%, only 17,344 ballots were 
cast for City Councillors, a turnout of approximately 15.98% (Montgomery County 
Election Commission, 2016).  
4.2.6. Incumbency Effect 
Table 8  Incumbents Running in Previous Electoral Contests in Clarksville, 
Tennessee, USA 












2020 7 1 0 0% 
2018 7 5 3 60% 
2016 6 4 3 75% 
 
In the 2020 city elections of the seven wards up for election, only one race had 
an incumbent running. That incumbent lost their race to a candidate who had previously 
served as City Councillor in 2012. In this race, the incumbent placed third, with 16.22 
percentage points separating them from the winner. Therefore, while the winner had 
previous city council experience, it can be observed that 100% of the individuals who 
won were newly elected individuals, meaning no incumbents were re-elected. 
In the 2018 city elections, of the six ward positions and the mayoral position, five 
races had an incumbent who ran. Of those five races, three saw the incumbent win, and 
in one of those races, the incumbent ran unopposed. In two cases where the incumbents 
31 
lost, they lost by 0.63 percentage points and 21.44 percentage points. In the cases 
where incumbents won, they won by 15.42 percentage points, 22.17 percentage points, 
and 97.56 percentage points (this candidate ran unopposed, and the difference in votes 
was for write-in candidates). Of the seven elected individuals, three or 42.86% were 
incumbents, and four or 57.14% were newly elected individuals.  
In the 2016 city election, of the six ward positions, four races had incumbents 
who ran. Of those four races, three were won by incumbents. In the race where the 
incumbent lost, they lost by a 0.76 percentage point difference. In the races where the 
incumbents won, they won by 34.84 percentage points, 29.84 percentage points, and 
95.66 percentage points. The candidate with the largest victory margin ran unopposed, 
and the difference in votes was for write-in candidates. Therefore, of the six elected City 
Councillors, three or 50% were incumbents, and three or 50% were newly elected 
individuals.  
By observing the trend over the past three elections in Clarksville, 10 races 
featured incumbents, and of those 10 races, incumbents won 60% of those races. 
However, those races only accounted for 50% of the total races in the past three 
elections. Factoring in all of the electoral contests, incumbents’ victories accounted for 
six of 20 races or 30% of all electoral victories. A factor for the decreased incumbent win 
rate can be attributed to council term limits and the normalization of new faces in 
municipal politics. Half of the races in the past three elections did not see any 
incumbents run.  
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4.3. Case Study 3 – Long Beach 
4.3.1. Demographics 
Table 9  Demographics: Long Beach, California, USA 
 2019 Population Estimate Census 2010 
Non-Hispanic Whites 28.2% 29.4% 
"Black or African American" 12.7% 13.5% 
“Asian Alone” 13.1% 12.9% 
“Hispanic” 42.6% 40.8% 
“American Indian and Alaska 
Native” 
1.1% 0.7% 
Calculated Visible Minority 
Percentage  
70.7% 69.9% 
Total Population 462,628 462,257 
*Data Taken From United States Census Bureau 
Table 9 shows the latest population estimates from July 1, 2019 and data from 
the 2010 Census, as collected by the United States Census Bureau. As the table shows, 
visible minorities account for the majority of the population of Long Beach, accounting for 
approximately 70% of the total population in both 2010 and 2019. The largest visible 
minority subgroup is Hispanic, accounting for over 40% of the population. Non-Hispanic 
Whites account for under 30% and have been decreasing since 1970 when non-
Hispanic Whites accounted for 86.2% of the population.  
4.3.2. Background on City Council Structure 
Long Beach, California was formed in 1897 and is a charter city (Long Beach, 
n.d.-a). In 1904 a Board of Freeholders was elected to create a City Charter, which was 
ratified in 1907 (Long Beach, n.d.-b). Upon the passing of the City Charter, the city 
council was created, where the city was divided into seven wards, and a Councillor was 
elected from each of them. At the same time, the first Mayor was elected in 1907 (Long 
Beach, n.d.-b). In 1921, the charter was amended to mandate a manager-council form of 
government, and three-year terms were established (Long Beach, n.d.-b). In 1929, 
voters approved a process where Councillors were elected to represent districts (wards) 
of the city, however, votes for these district representatives were conducted at-large with 
the entire city being eligible to vote (Long Beach, n.d.-b). In 1976, terms were increased 
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to four years, and the charter was amended so that Councillors were elected from 
wards, and unlike previously, only residents of that ward were eligible to elect the 
Councillor (Long Beach, n.d.-b).  
Long Beach utilizes a Council-Manager System. In a Council-Manager style 
government, an elected city council serves as the primary legislative body for the 
municipality. The legislative body has the authority to appoint a Chief Executive Officer, 
called the City Manager, whose role is to oversee the day-to-day municipal operations, 
draft a budget, and implement and enforce the city council’s policy and legislative 
initiatives. The city council is made up of nine elected council members and a Mayor. 
Currently, the City of Long Beach is separated into nine districts, and each of the nine 
Councillors is elected from and represents a district. While Councillors are elected 
through wards, the Mayor is elected at-large. The Mayor in Long Beach acts as the Chief 
Administrative Officer of the legislative department of government and has the power to 
veto the actions of city council in accordance with Section 213 of the Charter. The Mayor 
presides at city council meetings, where they have no vote but are allowed to participate 
in the deliberation and proceedings of city council. The Mayor also acts as the 
ceremonial head of the city government. The City of Long Beach is responsible for its 
own police and fire departments, as well as water and sewage services, oil and gas, 
health services, sanitation services, audits and has a city prosecutor. 
4.3.3. Elections 
The City of Long Beach holds both primary and general (also known as runoff) 
elections. In a primary election, if a candidate receives a majority of the votes that 
candidate is elected, however, if no candidate receives over 50% of the votes, the 
candidates who received the largest share of the votes proceed to a runoff election. The 
candidate who receives the most votes at the runoff election gets elected to the position. 
These rules are not applicable to special elections, where no matter how many 
candidates run, the winner is the one with the largest vote share, regardless of if it is 
under 50% of total votes. Prior to the 2018 election, Long Beach held a primary election 
in April and a runoff election in June. However, after an amendment to the city charter, 
the election dates changed, starting with the 2020 election. The primary nominating 
election for elected officials is held in even-numbered years on the first Tuesday after the 
first Monday in March and the general election being held in even-numbered years on 
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the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November. Elections for odd-number districts 
and even-number districts are never held during the same general elections, with odd 
being held one election, and even being held in the next.  
4.3.4. Representation Breakdown City and City Council 
In terms of representation on city council, currently, of the nine elected City 
Councillors, six belong to visible minority communities. With the addition of the Mayor, 
who also belongs to a visible minority community, the total proportion of visible minorities 
currently elected to city council in Long Beach is seven of the 10, or 70%. These 
numbers hold for the composition of the council beyond the 2018 election where five 
positions were contested, and city council beyond the 2016 election, where three 
positions were contested, with both councils having 70% of their members belong to a 
visible minority community. 
Figure F  Percentage of Visible Minorities in Long Beach Compared to the 
Percentage of Visible Minorities Elected to Long Beach City Council, 
2016-2020 
 
Figure F compares the percentage of visible minorities in Long Beach (using the 
closest demographic data at the time of the election) to the percentage of visible 
minorities elected to city council from 2016 to 2020. As can be seen, the percentage of 
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visible minorities elected to city council has remained consistent over the past three 
elections, at 70%, and is proportionate to the share of visible minorities in the general 
population.  
4.3.5. Voter Turnout 
In the 2020 general election, where three Councillor positions were on the ballot, 
approximately 69.23% of eligible electors voted (Office of the City Clerk of Long Beach, 
n.d.). In the 2018 election, where four of the Councillor positions and the Mayoral 
position were on the ballot, approximately 15.83% of eligible electors voted (Office of the 
City Clerk of Long Beach, 2018). In the 2016 election, where three Councillor positions 
were on the ballot, approximately 13.89% of eligible electors voted for city council (Office 
of the City Clerk of Long Beach, 2016). Voter turnout for the 2020 municipal election 
seems to be an outlier and can be explained by being held concurrently with the United 
States presidential election.  
4.3.6. Incumbency Effect 
Table 10  Incumbents Running in Previous Electoral Contests in Long Beach, 
California, USA 












2020 3 2 1 50% 
2018 5 5 5 100% 
2016 3 2 2 100% 
 
In the 2020 election, of the three contested positions, two of the electoral 
contests had incumbents running. Of those contests, one saw the incumbent win by a 
margin of 13.54 percentage points, while the other saw the incumbent lose by a margin 
of 19.58 percentage points (Office of the City Clerk of Long Beach, n.d.). 
In the 2018 election, of the five contested positions, all five electoral contests had 
incumbents running. In each of the five contests, the incumbents won. The incumbents 
won by margins of 57.56 percentage points, 65.40 percentage points, 10.79 percentage 
points, 6.19 percentage points, and 59.64 percentage points (Office of the City Clerk of 
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Long Beach, 2018).). On average, incumbents won by a margin of 39.92 percentage 
points. 
In the 2016 election, of the three contested positions, two electoral contests 
featured incumbents. In both of the two contests, the incumbents won by margins of 
18.46 percentage points and 24.98 percentage points (Office of the City Clerk of Long 
Beach, 2016). On average, the incumbents won by a margin of 21.72 percentage points. 
Through observing these three elections in Long Beach, it can be seen that out 
of the 11 electoral contests, incumbents ran in nine, or 81.82% of electoral contests over 
the past three elections. Of those nine contests, the incumbents won eight, or 88.89%. 
Overall, incumbents were victorious in 72.73% of electoral contests. 
4.4. Case Study 4 – Saint Paul  
4.4.1. Demographics 
Table 11  Demographics: Saint Paul, Minnesota, USA 
 2019 Population Estimates Census 2010 
Total Population 308,096 285,068 
Calculated Visible Minority 
Percentage 
47.8% 43.0% 
Non-Hispanic Whites 51.4% 55.9% 
“Black or African American 
Alone” 
16.1% 15.7% 
“Asian Alone” 18.7% 15.0% 
“Hispanic” 9.2% 9.6% 
“American Indian and Alaska 
Native”  
0.8% 1.1% 
*Data Taken From United States Census Bureau 
Table 11 shows the latest population estimates from July 1, 2019 and data from 
the 2010 Census, as collected by the United States Census Bureau. The table compares 
the visible minority percentage and the share of population of significant visible minority 
and non-visible minority sub-groups, as identified by the United States Census Bureau. 
As the table shows, visible minorities account for 47.8% of the total population and have 
increased by 4.8 percentage points since 2010. While non-Hispanic Whites are still the 
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largest group in Saint Paul, “Asians” and “Black or African American” visible minority 
populations account for 18.7% and 16.1% respectively.  
4.4.2. Background on City Council Structure 
The City of Saint Paul was incorporated in 1854. Before 1980, the Saint Paul city 
council consisted of seven members elected at-large (City of Saint Paul, 2019). In 1980, 
the Saint Paul City Charter was amended to create seven wards, of which one City 
Councillor be elected from each (City of Saint Paul, 2019). A lawsuit, Baker v. Carr 
required the wards to each be proportionate to each other (City of Saint Paul, 2019). The 
city is responsible for policy areas including granting licenses, public works, policing, fire 
and paramedics, emergency management, parks and recreation, water and utilities, 
planning and economic development, as well as safety and inspections of the public and 
buildings. Currently, the city continues to have seven Councillors elected from seven 
wards and uses a strong mayor-council format for governing. This system sees the 
Mayor act as Chief Executive and Chief Administrative Officer for the city. Amongst the 
Mayor’s duties are the control the administration of the city’s affairs, enforcing the city 
charter, laws and ordinances, appoint the city attorney and heads of executive 
departments, supervise the administration of all city departments, prepare and 
recommend to council the city’s budget, approve or veto council ordinances and 
resolutions, and appoint members to boards, commissions and advisory committees 
(City of Saint Paul 2021b). The Mayor can attend and participate in council meetings but 
cannot vote with the exception of specific instances (City of Saint Paul 2021b). Whereas 
City Councillors are elected from wards, the Mayor is elected at-large. According to the 
city charter, all legislative power rests in council and City Councillors. Council is 
responsible for setting the city’s policies through the passing of ordinances and 
resolutions (City of Saint Paul, 2021a). Council also performs auditing decisions and 
monitors the operation and performance of city agencies, as well council is responsible 
for passing the proposed budget for the city (City of Saint Paul, 2021a). Council also 
performs a quasi-judicial role in hearing appeals regarding actions taken by city 
agencies (City of Saint Paul, 2021a). Councillors are considered to be part-time roles 
(City of Saint Paul 2021b). Both the Mayor and City Councillors serve four-year terms.  
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4.4.3. Elections 
Elections for City Councillors occur in wards, while the mayoral election occurs 
at-large. All city elections in Saint Paul are conducted by Ramsey County. In 2009, Saint 
Paul changed its ballot system from first-past-the-post to single transferable vote for both 
city council and mayoral elections. However, since the city council has wards where a 
single candidate wins, the single transferable vote system functions largely as ranked-
choice voting. In Saint Paul’s single-transferable vote systems, voters rank candidates in 
order of preference. In order to be elected candidates must receive at least 50% of the 
first-choice votes. If no candidate receives 50% of the total votes, the candidates with 
the least first preferences votes are eliminated, and the second-choice votes on those 
ballots are tabulated and added to the total of the remaining candidates. This process 
continues until one candidate wins an outright majority. Elections are fixed-date 
occurring on the first Tuesday of November on a four-year cycle. Candidates are allowed 
to use partisan materials in campaigning and are allowed to identify and belong to a 
state or federal political party, although there are no city parties. Candidates are allowed 
to form and run under slates.  
4.4.4. Representation Breakdown City and City Council 
In terms of representation on the city council currently, of the seven City 
Councillors, three are members of a visible minority community, as is the Mayor, who is 
Saint Paul’s first African American Mayor. In total, four of the eight or 50% elected official 
are members of a visible minority community. The 50% represents an increase from 
previous years. City council after the 2015 election was comprised of only one visible 
minority Councillor of the seven City Councillors. At the time the Mayor was not a 
member of a visible minority community. This meant that visible minorities accounted for 
one of eight elected officials or 12.5% of elected officials. The same is true of Saint Paul 
city council after the 2011 general election, where only one of the eight elected officials 
was a member of a visible minority community. 
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Figure G  Percentage of Visible Minorities in Saint Paul Compared to the 
Percentage of Visible Minorities Elected to Saint Paul City Council, 
2011-2019 
 
Figure G compares the percentage of visible minorities in Saint Paul (using the 
closest demographic data at the time of the election) to the percentage of visible 
minorities elected to city council from 2011 to 2019. The city councils elected after the 
2011 and 2015 elections had a visible minority representation gap of approximately 30.5 
percentage points. After the 2019 election, the visible minority representation on city 
council is 2.2 percentage points greater than the share of the total population. The 
increase in representation between the 2015 council and the 2019 council is 37.5 
percentage points or three additional visible minority elected officials. To note, in 2017, 
the mayoral election was held, and a visible minority was elected to the position. 
Subsequently, in 2018 a special election was held in Ward 4, where another visible 
minority was elected. 
4.4.5. Voter Turnout 
In the 2019 general election where all seven Councillor positions were contested, 
of the 165,725 registered voters, 54,122 cast their ballots for Councillors, a voter turnout 
of 32.65% (Office of the Minnesota Secretary of State, 2019). In the 2015 general 
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registered voters, only 26,660 ballots were cast for Councillors, a voter turnout of 
17.69% (Office of the Minnesota Secretary of State, 2015). In the 2011 general election, 
where all seven Councillor positions were contested, of the 155,247 registered voters, 
29,802 ballots were cast for Councillors, a voter turnout of 19.20% (Office of the 
Minnesota Secretary of State, 2011). 
Comparing the turnout in Councillor elections to mayoral elections, there is a 
noticeable difference. In the 2017 mayoral election, of the 156,543 registered voters, 
61,646 ballots were cast, a turnout of 39.38% (Office of the Minnesota Secretary of 
State, 2017). In the 2013 mayoral election, of the 154, 672 registered voters, 30,518 
ballots were cast, a turnout of 19.73% (Office of the Minnesota Secretary of State, 
2013). In the 2009 mayoral election (which was conducted under the former first-past-
the-post system, before the city switched to Single Transferable Vote), of 157,859 
registered voters, 34,042 ballots were cast, a turnout of 21.56% (Office of the Minnesota 
Secretary of State, 2009). 
Comparing the elections observed, neither the mayoral election nor the city 
council elections had voter turnout rates above 40%. However, the mayoral election 
sees higher rates of turnout consistently. The increase in turnout in the 2019 Councillor 
election can be explained by the city-wide referendum on garbage collection that 
occurred concurrently. A scan of media sources confirms that this referendum was a 
highly salient issue for Saint Paul residents at the time (Walsh, 2019; Nelson, 2019; 
Melo and Rademacher, 2019). 
4.4.6. Incumbency Effect 
Table 12  Incumbents Running in Previous Electoral Contests in Saint Paul, 
Minnesota, USA 











2019 7 6 6 100% 
2015 7 5 5 100% 
2011 7 6 5 83.33% 
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In the 2019 Councillor election, of the seven positions up for election, six 
electoral contests had incumbents running. Of those contests, incumbents won in all six. 
The incumbents won by margins of 6.2 percentage points, 39.6 percentage points, 21.6 
percentage points, 32.1 percentage points, 25.9 percentage points and 45.4 percentage 
points (Office of the Minnesota Secretary of State, 2019). Overall, incumbents won by an 
average margin of 28.5 percentage points, and all except for one were elected in the first 
round of voting. 
In the 2015 Councillor election, of the seven positions up for election, five 
electoral contests saw incumbents run. Of those contests, incumbents won in all five 
contests. The incumbents won by margins of 70.2 percentage points, 83.7 percentage 
points, 23.4 percentage points, 18.3 percentage points, and 60.2 percentage points 
(Office of the Minnesota Secretary of State, 2015). Overall, incumbents won by an 
average margin of 51.2 percentage points, and all incumbents were elected in the first 
round of voting. 
In the 2011 Councillor election, of the seven positions up for election, six 
electoral contests had incumbents run. Of those contests, incumbents were victorious in 
five, or 83.3% of contests. Of the contests where incumbents won, they were elected by 
margins of 32.5 percentage points, 15 percentage points, 54.3 percentage points, 16.7 
percentage points, and 86.4 percentage points (Office of the Minnesota Secretary of 
State, 2011). Overall, incumbents won by an average margin of approximately 41 
percentage points, and all winning incumbents except for one were elected in the first 
round of voting. In the race where the incumbent lost, they lost by a margin of 0.98 
percentage points in the first round of voting. 
By observing the trend over the past three general elections in Saint Paul, 17 out 
of 21 electoral contests, or approximately 81% of electoral contests featured incumbents 
running. Of those 17 contests, incumbents won in 16 or 94.1%. Overall, incumbents won 
76.2% of all electoral contests in Councillor general elections in Saint Paul over the past 
three general election cycles. 
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4.5. Case Study 5 – Seattle 
4.5.1. Demographics 
Table 13  Demographics: Seattle, Washington, USA 
 2019 Population Estimate Census 2010 
Non-Hispanic Whites 63.8% 66.3% 
"Black or African American" 7.3% 7.9% 
“Asian Alone” 15.4% 13.8% 
“Hispanic” 6.7% 9% 
“American Indian and Alaska 
Native” 
0.5% 0.8% 
Calculated Visible Minority 
Percentage  
35.7% 32.9% 
Total Population 753,675 608,660 
*Data Taken From United States Census Bureau 
Table 13 shows the latest population estimates from July 1, 2019 and data from 
the 2010 Census, as collected by the United States Census Bureau. The table compares 
the visible minority percentage and the share of population of significant visible minority 
and non-visible minority sub-groups, as identified by the United States Census Bureau. 
As the table shows, the percentage of visible minorities has increased marginally by 2.8 
percentage points, accounting for a little over a third of the total population of Seattle 
residents. Seattle’s population is largely “non-Hispanic White”, accounting for 
approximately two-thirds of the total population. The largest visible minority sub-group is 
“Asian alone”, accounting for 15.4% of the total population. 
4.5.2. Background on City Council Structure 
Seattle is designated as a first-class Charter city under RCW 35.01.010 (Office of 
the Seattle City Clerk, n.d.-h). A first-class city is a city with a population of 10,000 or 
more at the time of organization or reorganization that has adopted a charter (Municipal 
Research and Services Centre, 2019). Seattle is also a charter city, and the Seattle City 
Charter defines the city’s powers and duties. City council is responsible for approving the 
city’s budget and develops laws and policies related to city and local affairs, including 
city police, firefighting, parks, libraries, water supply, electricity, waste and 
utilities. Seattle utilizes a mayor-council form of government. The Mayor is elected at 
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large, while the nine City Councillors are elected. Seven of the Councillors are elected 
from seven districts and two are elected at-large. The Mayor acts as the city’s Chief 
Executive Officer and is responsible for proposing the budget, signing legislation into 
law, appointing departmental heads and overseeing the day-to-day operations of the 
city.  
Seattle was first incorporated as a Town by Territorial Legislation in 1865, 
however, the act was repealed in 1867, after a citizens petition for its dissolution (Office 
of the Seattle City Clerk, n.d.-g). Seattle was again incorporated in 1869, however this 
time, as a city. In 1884 the ward system was introduced in the city, three Councillors 
were elected from each of the three newly established wards for two-year terms (Office 
of the Seattle City Clerk, n.d.-f). In 1886, another ward was added, and council was 
reduced to eight elected members, two from each ward (Office of the Seattle City Clerk, 
n.d.-f). In 1890, First Home Rule Charter was adopted which increased the number of 
wards to eight and created a bicameral city council, which consisted of a nine-member 
board of Alderman, each elected at-large for four-year terms, and a house of delegate, 
where two members were elected from each of the City’s eight wards (Office of the 
Seattle City Clerk, n.d.-e). In 1896, city council was changed to a unicameral body with 
13 members (Office of the Seattle City Clerk, n.d.-d). In 1910, the city charter was again 
amended and the ward system was demolished, changing council to have nine elected 
at-large members for three-year overlapping terms (In 1911 nine members were elected, 
three for one-year terms, three for two-year terms, and three for three-year terms); at 
this time, the charter also made elections non-partisan (Office of the Seattle City Clerk, 
n.d.-c). In 1946, the charter was amended to make elections be held every two years. 
Councillor terms were also extended to four years and the President of the Council 
would serve two years (Office of the Seattle City Clerk, n.d.-b). In 2013, after the 
submission of a petition by voters, council approved a charter amendment (Amendment 
19), which divided the city into seven districts, and allowed two Councillors to be elected 
at-large (Office of the Seattle City Clerk, n.d.-a). At the time of creation, the districts 
represented similar population totals. The first election testing this new system was 
conducted in 2015, where the seven district Councillors were elected for a four-year 
term, while the two at-large Councillors were elected for a two-year term. After 2017, the 
term length for the two at-large Councillors was increased to four years. 
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4.5.3. Representation Breakdown City and City Council 
In terms of visible minority representation on city council, after the 2019 election 
where seven of the district seats were up for election, of the nine City Councillor 
positions, five are members of visible minority communities. Including the position of 
Mayor, who is not a member of a visible minority community, 50% of the city council are 
members of a visible minority group. Both of the Councillors who are elected at-large are 
members of a visible minority community, while three of the seven districts have elected 
visible minority Councillors. After the prior election in 2017 where the two at-large seats 
were up for election, five of the 10 city council positions were held by visible minorities. 
In the 2015 election, where all nine Councillor seats were up for election, four visible 
minorities were elected to council. Including the non-visible minority Mayor, four of 10, or 
40% of city council were visible minorities. Figure H compares the percentage of visible 
minorities in Seattle (using the closest demographic data at the time of the election) to 
the percentage of visible minorities elected to city council from 2015 to 2019. There is a 
trend of overrepresentation of visible minorities in comparison to their share of the 
population. 
Figure H  Percentage of Visible Minorities in Seattle Compared to Percentage 













Seattle 2015 Seattle 2017 Seattle 2019
Percentage of Visible Minority (closest census year)
Percentage of visible minority elected to city council
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4.5.4. Elections 
Officially elections are non-partisan with no party identification being placed on 
the ballot (Washington State Legislature, n.d.). Candidates are able to voluntarily self-
identify their party identification during the campaign. For the mayoral and Councillor 
positions, Seattle hosts two elections; a primary election, to identify the top two 
candidates for a given position, and a general election where the winner of the two 
selected candidates is elected to the position. City council elections occur in odd-
numbered years and the elections for at-large seats are staggered from the district-
based positions. For example, in 2019, the seven district council seats were up for 
election, while in 2017, the mayoral and the two at-large Councillor seats were up for 
election. Both the primary and at-large elections for all positions are conducted through a 
first-past-the-post ballot. 
4.5.5. Voter Turnout 
In the 2019 municipal election, where the seven district Councillors were elected, 
in the primary election, of the 470,304 registered voters, 197,568 ballots were cast, a 
turnout of 42.01% (Seattle Ethics & Elections Commission, 2020). In the general 
election, of the 475,390 registered voters, 258,919 ballots were cast, a turnout of 
54.46% (Seattle Ethics & Elections Commission, 2020). In 2017, where the Mayor and 
the two at-large council seats were elected, in the primary election, of the 463,660 
registered voters, 187,741 ballots were cast, a turnout of 40.49% (Seattle Ethics & 
Elections Commission, 2018). In the general election, of the 456,871 registered voters, 
224,808 ballots were cast, a turnout of 49.21% (Seattle Ethics & Elections Commission, 
2018). In the 2015 election, where all of the nine city council positions were on the ballot, 
in the primary election, of the 414,340 registered voters, 126,012 ballots were cast, a 
turnout of 30.40% (Seattle Ethics & Elections Commission, 2016). In the general 
election, of the 419,292 registered voters, 191,267 ballots were cast, a turnout of 45.6% 
(Seattle Ethics & Elections Commission, 2016). 
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4.5.6. Incumbency Effect 
Table 14  Incumbents Running in Previous Electoral Contests in Seattle, 
Washington, USA 












2019 7  3 3 100% 
2017 3 1 1 100% 
2015 9 5 5 100% 
 
In the 2019 general elections for City Councillors, of the seven electoral contests, 
three featured incumbents running. Of those races, the incumbents won all three by 
margins of 11.7 percentage points, 4.2 percentage points, and 21.6 percentage points 
(The Seattle Times, 2019). The average margin an incumbent won by was 12.5 
percentage points. 
In the 2017 general election, of the three electoral contests, one featured an 
incumbent running. The incumbent won that contest by a margin of 38 percentage points 
(The Seattle Times, 2017). 
In the 2015 general election, of the nine electoral contests, five saw incumbents 
run. Of those races, incumbents were victorious in all five contests. Incumbents were 
victorious by margins of 2.4 percentage points, 11.5 percentage points, 22.7 percentage 
points, 62.5 percentage points, and 10.2 percentage points (The Seattle Times, 2015). 
The average margin incumbents won by was 21.9 percentage points. 
By observing the past three elections in Seattle, it can be observed that every 
time an incumbent ran in an electoral contest, they won that contest. Incumbent 
contested electoral contests accounted for nine of the 19 contests, or 47.4% of contests 
over the past three elections. The incumbency effect is present in Seattle, it seems that 
incumbents do not run in the same strength as other case study cities, running in less 
than 50% of electoral contests. 
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4.6. Insights Gained from Case Studies  
There are three key takeaways from the case study analysis:  
First, while all case study jurisdictions had wards, they also all had instances 
where representation was more proportionate than in Metro Vancouver municipalities 
whose local governments are based on at-large systems. Both municipalities with visible 
minority populations under 50% of the total population and over 50% of the total 
population saw higher rates of descriptive representation than in the at-large system in 
Metro Vancouver. While there are election years where the wards do yield large gaps in 
representation, the rate at which visible minority candidates get elected compared to the 
at-large system in Metro Vancouver indicates that it is easier for visible minority 
candidates to get elected in ward systems than in at-large systems. 
Second, in the case study jurisdictions where visible minorities accounted for less 
than 50% of the total population (Calgary; Clarksville; Saint Paul; Seattle), election years 
that saw the highest voter turnout, yielded the election of the most representative local 
governments. This phenomenon indicates that when a larger proportion of the electorate 
votes, there is a higher likelihood that government that is reflective of the electorate at 
whole. In Calgary, the highest turnout in the observed elections was 58.1% in the 2017 
election (see section 4.1.5), the election that elected the current city council. Currently, 
visible minorities account for 26.67% of city council, which according to Figure D was the 
highest rate of the observed city councils. In Clarksville, the highest turnout in the 
observed elections was 21.43% in the 2020 election (see section 4.2.5). Of the 2020 city 
council, visible minorities account for 46.2% of the city council, which as seen in Figure 
E is the highest rate of the observed city councils. In Saint Paul, the turnout in the 
observed elections was 32.65% in the 2019 general election (see section 4.4.5). Of the 
2019 city council, visible minorities accounted for 50% of city council, which as seen in 
Figure G is the highest rate of the observed city councils. In Seattle, the highest turnout 
in the observed elections was 54.46% in 2019 (see section 4.5.5). Of the 2019 city 
council, visible minorities accounted for 50% of city council. As seen in Figure H, this is 
tied for the highest observed, along with the 2017 council, that also consisted of 50% 
visible minorities (while the voter turnout was 49.21%). 
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Finally, just as in Metro Vancouver, candidates who have prior governance 
experience and name recognition (measured as incumbents) had a distinct advantage in 
elections. Incumbents were elected at higher rates throughout all of the cases studied, 
the sole outlier being Clarksville, where there are term limits set on incumbents. In the 
three observed elections in Calgary, incumbents won an average of 91.17% of their 
electoral contests (see section 4.1.6). In the three observed elections in Long Beach, 
incumbents won an average of 83.33% of their electoral contests (see section 4.3.6). In 
the three observed elections in Saint Paul, incumbents won an average of 94.44% of 
their electoral contests (see section 4.4.6). In the three observed elections in Seattle, 
incumbents won an average of 100% of their electoral contests (see section 4.5.6). 
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Chapter 5. Interviews 
Five current local government elected officials and one former mayoral candidate 
were interviewed on the topic of visible minority representation in local governments 
(interviewee jurisdictions and roles can be found in Table 15). The interviews utilized a 
semi-structured interview guide. Specifically, interviewees were asked about their 
thoughts on the importance of visible minority representation at the local government 
level, barriers that visible minorities may face to successfully being elected, how 
electoral systems impact visible minority candidates, and the role of voter turnout on city 
council diversity. The findings of these interviews can be found below, as well as other 
key themes that emerged across interviews.  
Table 15  List of Interviewees 
Interviewee  Jurisdiction Role 
1 Metro Vancouver Current City Councillor 
2 Metro Vancouver Current City Councillor  
3 Metro Vancouver Former Mayoral Candidate 
4 Case Study Municipality Current City Councillor 
5 Case Study Municipality  Current City Councillor 
6 Non-Case Study, Major 
American Municipality 
Current City Councillor 
 
5.1. Importance of Visible Minority Representation at the 
Local Government Level 
All interview respondents indicated that visible minority representation at the local 
government level is important. All of the respondents shared similar views on the 
importance of visible minority representation, agreeing that it can impact the policies 
produced by local governments. Interviewee 4 highlighted that having a diverse group of 
elected officials means that council can reach more groups of people than a more 
homogenous council might be able to, impacting the city’s policy positions. Interviewee 1 
specified that having elected officials who are attuned to the cultures and values of 
different visible minority groups is crucial, as it brings forward a more nuanced approach 
when dealing with disputes. The same respondent believed that members of visible 
minority communities better understand the differences between visible minority groups 
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and subgroups than non-visible minority individuals, and thus are able to engage with 
them in more meaningful ways. In the absence of this cultural understanding, 
engagement with these visible minority communities can often feel trivial and superficial. 
Interviewees 4 and 6 both specified that in the absence of elected representation, 
councils need to make an effort to engage with visible minority communities through 
direct contact with citizens or interest groups, in order to ensure that their views are 
reflected in city policies.  
5.2. Barriers Faced by Visible Minority Candidates When 
Seeking Election 
To varying degrees, respondents believed that there are unique barriers faced by 
visible minority candidates when seeking election at the local level. Interviewee 5 
believed that by being a visible minority, individuals are more likely to be disconnected 
from the political establishment, thereby being at a lower level of base political 
knowledge and are less likely to have access to political resources to launch a 
campaign. The same respondent stated that the barriers that visible minorities face in 
daily life, such as discrimination and facing negative biases, are the same barriers that 
are present and entrenched in political life. Other interviewees believed that barriers 
faced by visible minority candidates are more often financial and resource-based in 
nature. Interviewee 1, 2, and 4 stated that municipal elections are resource-intensive, 
both time and financial, and they believe that visible minority candidates are less likely to 
be able to commit the necessary resources, generalizing that this may be due to them 
having less stable employment conditions or lower financial stability in comparison to 
non-visible minority candidates. These interviewees also mentioned that visible 
minorities may not have the social networks to organize an effective campaign, nor 
might they have the time to effectively campaign, due to precarious work conditions, or 
culturally tied family responsibilities. 
5.3. Electoral System Impact on Visible Minority Candidates 
Interviewees 1, 2, and 3 participated in elections under an at-large system and 
interviewees 4, 5, and 6 under a ward system. Universally, the interviewees all agreed 
that at-large elections are the most difficult to win. At-large elections require more 
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resources, both financial, time, and social. As discussed in the section above, half of the 
interviewees stated that visible minority candidates are less likely to have the necessary 
resources to effectively run a campaign, and as at-large systems require the most 
resources, interviewees 4, 5, 6 believed that these systems disadvantaged visible 
minority candidates. However, not all interviewees believed that a ward system would be 
easier for visible minority candidates. Interviewees 3, 4, 5, and 6 believed that wards are 
beneficial for visible minority candidates. These respondents believe that wards improve 
the chances of visible minorities to be elected, as the financial resources required to 
successfully campaign in a ward is less than at-large elections.  
Interviewees 1 and 2 were hesitant to endorse wards. The interviewees pointed 
to Canadian cities such as Toronto, Ottawa, and Winnipeg that have wards but still 
suffer from poor representation of visible minorities. One of these interviewees conceded 
that wards would only be effective in securing representation in ethnic enclaves, and if 
the city’s visible minority population is more spread out, it may have a minimal or little 
effect. All of the interviewees from at-large systems cited a concern for polarization that 
may arise from a ward system, where Councillors would only advocate for policies 
impacting their constituents. 
Interviewee 5 ran in an election that used a ranked ballot style of voting. The 
interviewee believed that ranked ballot is more favourable to visible minority candidates 
than first-past-the-post elections. The interviewee believed that ranked ballot enables 
visible minorities to be able to more easily compete with each other and non-visible 
minority candidates, whereas in a first-past-the-post system visible minority candidates 
may end up splitting the vote amongst themselves. The interviewee also mentioned that 
ranked ballot elections enable visible minority candidates to more readily contest against 
the name recognition of incumbents. 
Interviewee 1, 2, 3, and 4 also noted that visible minority candidates suffer in 
local government elections when the municipality lacks a party system. Interviewee 4, 
who ran in a jurisdiction with no political parties, noted that running without the support of 
a party is taxing on the candidate’s resources. The interviewee also noted that they 
believe this strain is likely increased in an at-large system. 
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5.4. Role of Voter Turnout on the Diversity of City Councils 
All interviewees stated that they believe low voter turnout negatively impacts the 
diversity of city councils. Interviewees all mentioned that in their jurisdictions, visible 
minority electors have poor turnout in local government elections, especially when 
compared to turnout at higher levels of government. All interviewees believed that this is 
associated with a lack of knowledge on the role of local governments. Interviewee 4 
specifically cited the importance of educating the electorate, especially those who do not 
typically vote, to what specifically municipal governments do. When asked if an 
education campaign targeted to visible minority electors would increase diversity on city 
council, responses varied. Interviewees 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 believed that educating visible 
minorities about municipal governments would most likely increase voter turnout in those 
groups, however, these respondents did not believe that it alone would have a significant 
impact on electing visible minorities to council. Interviewee 4 disagreed, stating that in 
their jurisdiction, spending the time to educate visible minorities about the role of 
municipal governments encouraged visible minorities to go and vote, and they believe 
that contributed to them, a visible minority, getting elected in their jurisdiction. When 
asked, all six interviewees stated that they would support an increased government 
effort to educate voters on the role of local governments.  
5.5. Civic Engagement Programs 
Throughout the interviews, interviewees 1 and 2 raised the idea that while many 
visible minority candidates were running in previous municipal elections, a reason they 
may have lost is a lack of name recognition and being viewed as not having previous 
political or governance experience. Interviewee 1 mentioned meeting two young visible 
minority candidates whom they believed would have made excellent City Councillors, 
however, were not likely to win due to their lack of political skills and governance 
experience. One respondent explained that since municipal elections have a lower level 
of media coverage, often candidates who aren’t members of local parties or slates, or 
who are not incumbents or have served in other political offices, receive little attention 
from the media and electors. Interviewees were then given examples of programs that 
would give interested people opportunities to gain experience in local municipal 
governance and politics in order to gain and develop skills that respondents mentioned 
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unsuccessful candidates lacked. The programs that were discussed included increasing 
seats on municipal committees specifically for visible minorities, a youth city official or 
staff shadowing or internship program for visible minorities, or the establishment of a 
citizen’s assembly. Overall, all respondents viewed a youth internship favourably but 
questioned the utility of increasing or holding committee seats for visible minorities as 
well as the establishment of a citizen’s assembly on a given subject. Respondents 
questioned whether or not the later programs would reach those who have no 
experience or would they more likely attract those who already have experience or a 
base knowledge of the topics the committee or citizens assembly cover. Two of the four 
interviewees who discussed this issue in detail questioned whether it was the 
government’s role to provide this type of experience, suggesting that it might be more 
appropriate for non-profits or other communities to create and run these types of 
programs. The other two interviewees felt that governments could easily create an 
internship program or increase the seats on committees, however, making them 
exclusively for visible minorities may prove politically unpopular.  
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Chapter 6. Policy Options 
6.1. Policy Option 1: Electoral Reform – Moving from at-
large elections to a ward system 
The first policy option to be analyzed is having municipalities switch from at-large 
elections for city council to ward-based elections for city council. One factor that makes 
Metro Vancouver municipalities unique amongst the majority of Canadian cities and the 
observed case study jurisdictions, is a lack of a ward system. While there are many 
types of ward systems (i.e., multi-member districts, mixed wards and at-large), for this 
analysis, wards will only be used to elect City Councillors, while the Mayor would still be 
elected at-large. It is important to note that since this research looks at representation 
across multiple cities in Metro Vancouver, no one model of a ward system will be 
advocated for, but rather, the idea of implementing a ward system. Each city should 
determine how the city would be divided into wards, and whether each ward would have 
a single Councillor, or multiple Councillor positions.  
Wards are not a new idea in Metro Vancouver. Before 1935, Vancouver had a 
ward system; however, it was abolished that year, largely to keep social democratic 
ideologies out of city politics (Andrew et al., 2008) – an idea that no longer seems 
relevant or prevalent today. In 2003, after holding 17 public forums and providing 
questionnaires, the Vancouver Electoral Reform Commission decided to put to a vote 
the issues of at-large versus ward elections. The City of Vancouver held the plebiscite in 
2004 on whether it should switch systems for electing Councillors. The “No” side 
received 35,813 or 54% of the vote, defeating the “Yes” who received 30,499 votes or 
46% of the total. While the question was specifically on wards versus the at-large 
system, the proposed ward structure would have also seen an increase from 10 City 
Councillors to 14 City Councillors. 
Nevertheless, wards re-entered the political discourse in Vancouver during the 
2018 municipal election where elected mayoral candidate Kennedy Stewart promised 
that should the provincial referendum on electoral reform fail, that a ward system similar 
to the provincial and federal riding system would be introduced at the municipal level in 
Vancouver (Howell, 2018); the referendum ended up failing. In Surrey, Mayor Doug 
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McCallum pledged in his election campaign to introduce a ward system to the city in 
2014, prior to his election in 2018 (Pablo, 2014).  
6.2. Policy Option 2: Civic Engagement – Introducing civic 
engagement opportunities for visible minority community 
members 
The second policy option to be analyzed is the introduction of civic engagement 
opportunities. These civic engagement opportunities would be created specifically as an 
avenue to get individuals more involved in engaging with the challenges facing their city 
while providing them with an avenue to gain experience in city governance and gain 
experience within the city structure. Civic engagement opportunities seek to provide 
potential candidates with an opportunity to build political expertise and gain valuable 
governance experience. The hope is that through these opportunities, not only will 
potential candidates gain a higher profile in order to combat incumbency bias and the 
name recognition deficit normally faced when competing against candidates who had 
previously served in other political offices or contested elections previously. But these 
opportunities would also educate potential candidates on city issues, what powers an 
elected official has, giving them a better idea on how to effectively campaign. 
During the expert interviews, respondents brought up the lack of quality visible 
minority candidates, defining quality as those with the political and governance 
experience, skills, acumen, and knowledge to be able to successfully get elected. To 
combat this, this policy option would see municipalities increase the opportunities for 
citizens to meaningfully engage with governance structures in their city, included but not 
limited to opening committees up to have citizen membership, forming and hosting 
consistent citizens assemblies, creating an internship or shadowing program and 
increasing citizen participation and interaction at council meetings. While many cities 
have positions opened on their committees, this program would see an internal mandate 
or, where appropriate, have seats added specifically for visible minority community 
members. 
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6.3. Policy Option 3: Civic Education – Educating 
candidates and electors through programming  
The third policy option is the creation and implementation of a civic education 
program. This program would not be targeted towards potential candidates, but instead 
would be meant for the entire electorate, differing from Policy Option 2. 
Municipalities across Metro Vancouver suffer from consistently low voter turnout. 
Literature shows that at the municipal level those with low levels of social capital are less 
likely to vote as they feel disconnected and often have few connections to collected 
knowledge or have their political knowledge validated (Gludovatz, 2014). A study looking 
at the 2005 Vancouver local government election found that citizens from the Chinese 
community were 50% less likely to have political knowledge about the election compared 
to White citizens (Gludovatz, 2014). Exit polls from that same study showed that White 
residents were more likely to vote than Chinese residents. Notably, 65% of voters were 
White, even though they, at the time, accounted for 51% of the city’s population 
(Gludovatz, 2014). Statistics Canada has found electors are more likely to vote if they 
are older, more educated, and economically well off (Uppal and LaRochelle-Côté, 2012). 
Further, non-immigrants, and those from Western Europe or “Anglosphere” countries, 
such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, or New Zealand, are more 
likely to vote than other immigrants or ethnic groups (Uppal and LaRochelle-Côté, 2012). 
In the case of Metro Vancouver, especially examining the ethnic breakdown of electors, 
this is not representative of the electorate as a whole, in order to have a chance at a 
more representative government, the active electorate needs to be more representative 
of the city’s demographics. 
In the expert interviews, all of the respondents cited the importance of voter 
turnout, with respondents from Metro Vancouver attributing the low voter turnout to being 
responsible for the lack of diversity in city council, and those in case study jurisdictions 
citing increased voter activity amongst visible minorities and being a reason for the 
increase in representation in their jurisdictions. Interviewees also revealed there can be 
a lack of understanding of what a city government is responsible for. This confusion can 
lead to electors deciding not to vote, as they do not value the role of local government, 
or electors voting for candidates who promise to do things that are not within the purview 
of a city council. Furthermore, due to the lack of media coverage and traditional (Federal 
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and Provincial) partisan cues, it is more difficult for an elector to gather information about 
all the candidates. 
The program in question, should be hosted by the city, at city hall, and should 
include information on the following areas: 
• The role and responsibilities of city hall, 
• Who makes up city council, 
• Role of council, Mayor and committees, 
• Role of city staff, who are senior members of city staff (and their roles), 
• When and what elections look like, 
• How to get involved, including how to connect with City Councillors, staff, and 
committees, 
• Rules and procedures at city council and committee meetings, how to make 
presentations, or submit questions.  
Another opportunity for educating visible minority communities would be to 
prepare education and outreach material, covering similar information stated above, and 
have it at cultural festivals and community events. In order for the outreach material to 
be effective, they should be in English, but also in the languages spoken by the visible 
minority communities in the jurisdiction. City officials and politicians could also conduct 
educational outreach through mediums that are heavily utilized by visible minority 
communities, such as ethnic radio and media sources.  
6.4. Policy Option 4: Status Quo  
Lastly, maintaining the status quo is an option that should be considered. No 
matter the actions taken, short of introducing quotas, there is no guarantee to see an 
increase in visible minority representation. 
There is a possibility that we are at a tipping point in history, only requiring the 
new generation of politicians to get involved, and the older incumbents to age out. Given 
that Metro Vancouver has cities where the majority of the population are visible 
minorities, and that the proportion of the visible minority population is growing, future 
elections may naturally see more representative governments. However, as mentioned, 
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there are cities with above 50% populations of visible minorities, and there are visible 
minority candidates that are running local government office, and on average are 
winning office less often than their non-visible minority counterparts.  
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Chapter 7. Criteria and Measures 
In conducting an assessment of the stated policy options in Chapter 6, four 
criteria have been established to evaluate each policy option. Attached to each criterion 
is the measurement that will be used to quantify the criterion. While each criterion is 
important, all will be equally weighted except for effectiveness, which has been given 
double the weight. This reflects that the primary purpose of any selected policy should 
be its effectiveness in addressing the problem and increasing visible minority 
representation. A table summarizing the criteria and measures to be used in the analysis 
can be found at the end of the chapter.  
7.1. Criterion 1: Effectiveness 
One of the most important factors when deciding which policy option to 
implement is simply, does it work? Here effectiveness is defined as whether or not the 
given policy option improves the likelihood of visible minorities getting elected. Note that 
this measures the likelihood of visible minorities getting elected, and not whether or not a 
given policy will increase the number of visible minorities getting elected. Due to the 
nature of elections, where multiple variables could impact the results of an election, such 
as the supply of visible minority candidates running, the only way to guarantee the 
election of visible minorities would be to implement a quotas system, guaranteeing a set 
number of seats to visible minorities. However, quotas are not being considered as a 
viable policy option as quotas do not exist in governments in North America and are 
problematic as they inherently hinder democratic freedoms.  
This criterion will be measured on a three-point scale, of “high likelihood”, 
“medium likelihood”, and “low likelihood”. Scoring high indicates that the policy option will 
have the best likelihood of increasing visible minorities being elected to local 
governments in proportional or better numbers to their share of the population. An option 
can obtain a “high” score if there is good evidence of effectiveness via both research 
methods (the case studies and the expert interviews). An option will score “medium” if its 
likelihood of increasing representation is supported by only one of the undertaken 
research methods. An option will score “low” if it has not been shown to be effective by 
either of the research methods.  
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7.2. Criterion 2: Stakeholder Acceptance – Public 
Acceptance 
Another criterion being considered is stakeholder acceptance. Given that the 
proposed solutions to this policy problem impact the public, the degree to which the 
general public supports or opposes the option is considered in this analysis. The degree 
to which public acceptance is present will be evaluated on a three-point scale, of “high 
acceptance”, “medium acceptance”, and “low acceptance”. A policy option will be 
deemed to have “high acceptance” if polls show public support to be 70% or above. A 
policy option will be deemed to have “medium acceptance” if polls show public support 
to be between 69% and 40%. A policy option will be deemed to have “low acceptance” if 
polls show public support to be 39% or below.  
7.3. Criterion 3: Stakeholder Acceptance – Politician 
Acceptance 
The acceptance of another stakeholder group will be considered, local 
government politicians, given that it will be up to these politicians to implement and 
advocate for any of these options. For this analysis, the degree to which politicians 
would be willing to accept and implement the policy options will be considered. Politician 
acceptance will be measured on a three-point scale of “high acceptance”, “medium 
acceptance”, and “low acceptance”. Since all six of the interviewees were or currently 
are municipal politicians, and all discussed and shared their views on the policy options 
that are being considered, we will use their support for a given option as a stand-in for 
politician acceptance, since we are unable to survey all current Metro Vancouver local 
government politicians. Note, an interviewee can find an option effective, but withhold 
support due to numerous factors. Therefore, the interviewee must have stated they 
support or would be willing to advance the option, with no hesitation. An option will score 
“high acceptance” if five or more of the interviewees are in favour of implementing the 
option. An option will score “medium acceptance” if three to four of the interviewees are 
in favour of implementing the option. An option will score “low acceptance” if zero to two 
of the interviewees are in favour of implementing the option.  
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7.4. Criterion 4: Administrative Complexity 
Another criterion that will be assessed is how complex the implementation of a 
given policy option will be. Invasive and complex interventions requiring organizational, 
or in the case of a government, legislative changes, are challenging and are less likely to 
be implemented than non-invasive and non-complex interventions. Administrative 
complexity will be measured on a three-point scale of “high complexity”, “medium 
complexity”, and “low complexity”. A policy will be given a score of “high complexity” if its 
implementation requires the creation or amending of provincial legislation, or changes in 
the practices of province-wide government organizations, such as Elections BC. 
“Medium complexity” will be measured as requiring legislative change at the city level, 
restructuring, or change at city-level departments or agencies. “Low complexity” will be 
measured as requiring no legislative change and minimal to no restructuring of 
government departments or agencies. 
Table 16  Criteria and Measures 
Objective Criterion Measure 
Effectiveness 
(Double Value) 
Likelihood of increasing the 
number of visible minorities 
elected to local government, as 
supported by the undertaken 
research methods. 
Low Likelihood: supported by 
neither method – (2) 
Medium Likelihood: supported 
by one of the two methods – (4) 
High Likelihood: supported by 
both of the methods – (6) 
Stakeholder Acceptance – 
Public Support 
Acceptability to members of the 
general public 
Low Acceptance: public 
polling with support at 39% or 
lower – (1) 
Medium Acceptance: public 
polling with support between 
40% and 69% – (2) 
High Acceptance: public 
polling with support at 70% or 
above – (3) 
Stakeholder Acceptance – 
Politician Support 
Acceptability amongst 
politicians and likelihood to be 
implemented by politicians 
Low Acceptance: supported 
by zero to two interviewees – 
(1) 
Medium Acceptance: 
supported by three to four 
interviewees – (2) 
High Acceptance: supported 
by five or more interviewees – 
(3) 
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Objective Criterion Measure 
Administrative Complexity Complexity, government level 
and invasiveness of change 
required to implement policy 
Low Complexity: no legislative 
change and minimal to no 
restricting of government 




required at municipal level – (2) 
High Complexity: legislative or 
departmental/agency change 










Chapter 8. Policy Evaluation 
The following chapter shows the analysis of policy options from Chapter 6 using 
the evaluation criteria from Chapter 7. The analysis is informed by the case studies and 
interviews and is presented with a justification for each rating. A matrix summarizing the 
ratings for each option can be found at the end of the chapter.  
8.1. Option 1: Electoral Reform – Moving from at-large 
elections to a ward system 
Effectiveness Stakeholder 
Acceptance – Public 
Acceptance 
Stakeholder 




High Likelihood (6) Low Acceptance (1) Medium Acceptance (2) High Complexity (1) 
 
8.1.1. Effectiveness  
The effectiveness of ward systems in increasing the likelihood of getting visible 
minorities elected to local government is supported in case studies and partially 
supported by the interviews.  
All five of the case study jurisdictions had a version of a ward-based system. 
Calgary, Clarksville, Long Beach, and Saint Paul all had wards for Councillors and kept 
the Mayor position elected at-large, while Seattle had a hybrid system, with seven wards 
and two Councillors elected at-large. In every instance, visible minorities were elected in 
more representative proportions than in Metro Vancouver’s at-large system. As 
mentioned in the summary of the case studies (section 4.6), although there are electoral 
cycles where visible minorities were underrepresented, on the whole, all jurisdictions 
saw dwindling representation gaps from election to election. 
In the case of the expert interviews, three of the interviewees believed that wards 
were effective in increasing visible minority representation. However, three interviewees 
voiced partial concern over the effectiveness, citing municipalities such as Toronto, 
Ottawa, and Winnipeg that have wards, but face underrepresentation of visible 
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minorities. However, this option is considered supported by the expert interviews, as one 
of these three did concede that wards would be effective in ethnic enclaves, in ensuring 
some minimal amount of representation.  
Given full support from the case studies and partial support from the interviews, 
this option scores high likelihood.  
8.1.2. Stakeholder Acceptance – Public Acceptance 
Unfortunately, there has been very little polling done on the subject of 
implementing a ward system in municipalities in Metro Vancouver, and this imposes a 
limitation on the analysis. Most of the existing local polling focuses on the two largest 
cities in Metro Vancouver, the City of Vancouver and the City of Surrey. The only recent 
polling occurred in 2020 and it focused solely on the City of Vancouver. Research Co. 
and Glacier conducted a poll where 52% of respondents in Vancouver were in favour of 
abandoning the at-large system used for municipal elections in favour of a ward system 
(Research Co., 2020). A poll conducted by Insights West after the 2014 municipal 
elections placed support for wards in Vancouver at 52%, with 19% opposed, and 28% 
undecided (Insights West, 2014b). The same poll showed support in Surrey at 43% in 
favour, while 23% of respondents were opposed, and 34% undecided (Insights West, 
2014b). The same Insight’s poll found that support in Metro Vancouver outside of 
Vancouver and Surrey is significantly smaller, with 24% of respondents being in favour 
of wards, 35% opposed, and 41% undecided (Insights West, 2014b). Another Insight 
West poll showed in 2014 prior to the municipal election showed support that 53% of 
respondents in the City of Surrey believed wards were a “very good” or “good” idea 
(Insight West, 2014a).  
If this analysis focused solely on the large municipalities in Metro Vancouver, this 
policy option would easily score a medium acceptance, given that our measure for 
medium acceptance demonstrated public support between 69 and 40 percentage points. 
However, in the most recent Metro Vancouver-wide survey, support for wards outside of 
Vancouver and Surrey was below the 40% threshold to attain the medium score. 
Therefore, for the region of Metro Vancouver, this policy option will be scored low 
acceptance.  
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8.1.3. Stakeholder Acceptance – Politician Acceptance 
Of the six interviewees, three outwardly stated that they support wards, while 
three expressed hesitation in supporting wards over an at-large system. Given that 
interviewees are being used as a stand-in measure for widespread politician 
acceptance, and because three of the interviewees support wards, this option scores 
medium acceptance. However, it is important to note that the three interviewees who 
support a ward system over the at-large system are from municipalities with wards, while 
the three interviewees who oppose wards are from at-large municipalities. As there are 
no ward systems in Metro Vancouver, one might imagine that actual support would be 
lower, However, In the City of Surrey and the City of Vancouver, the mayoral candidates 
and eventually winners and current Mayors advocated and supported the replacement of 
the at-large electoral system with wards. In 2021, Surrey’s city council instructed city 
staff to explore switching to a ward system, after a motion was approved in council to 
consider the transition to a ward system for election City Councillors, with many 
Councillors advocating that the matter be set to a referendum. Whereas in Vancouver, 
the Mayor did not pursue electoral reform citing a lack of public pressure (McElroy, 
2019). The three interviewees from the at-large jurisdictions also noted a concern over 
political polarization that may arise from wards, where Councillors would only advocate 
for issues that impact their constituents.  
8.1.4. Administrative Complexity  
To replace the at-large election system with a ward system, each municipality 
can pass a bylaw implementing wards. Whereas changes requiring city bylaws would 
score medium complexity. However, as mentioned in Chapter 2, municipal elections are 
shared between the municipality and Elections BC. There is also the added complexity 
of setting the ward boundaries. While the case studies showed that wards were created 
with an equal share of the population, the interviews showed that local politicians in 
municipalities where wards are not implemented questioned how the wards should be 
divided, whether the population considered should be qualified electors, taxpayers, 
existing neighbourhood boundaries, etc. Therefore, given the additional complexity of 
deciding the ward boundaries, as well as the additional coordination required between 
municipalities and Elections BC, this option scores high complexity.  
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8.2. Option 2: Civic Engagement – Introducing civic 
engagement opportunities for visible minority community 
members 
Effectiveness Stakeholder 
Acceptance – Public 
Acceptance 
Stakeholder 








Medium Complexity (2) 
 
8.2.1. Effectiveness 
In terms of support from the two research methods, this option is supported by 
one of the two methods. The case studies did not directly have any policies or programs 
such as the suggested civic engagement programs meant to increase the profile and 
governance experience of potential visible minority local government candidates. 
However, the case studies did show that programs that could increase the profile of 
visible minority candidates and provide them with governance experience would be 
helpful through an analysis of the win rate of incumbents. The case studies 
demonstrated that on average, the incumbents, who tend to be the most well covered, 
and have demonstrated governance experience win electoral contests on average at 
high rates, with five of the six jurisdictions having incumbents winning at a minimum, 
83.33% of electoral contests. Therefore, we can infer from the case studies that 
programs or methods to raise the profile and experience level of visible minority 
candidates could help combat this. 
It is in the expert interviews, where that link is more clearly made. Interviewees 
cited that visible minority candidates are viewed as unqualified as they suffer from a lack 
of governance and political experience. Introducing a suite of civic engagement 
programs that are designed to give visible minority members of the community 
experience in governance and civic politics would be beneficial for any visible minorities 
who may consider or be interested in seeking political office in the future. However, there 
is no guarantee that the participants will seek election after these programs, and there is 
no guarantee that if they seek election, that it would be at the local government level. 
However, programs such as the youth internship program, or increased opportunities to 
67 
serve on city committees, would help to resolve the “lack of political experience”. Given 
that the case studies setup, but do not directly show the effectiveness of this option, and 
the interviews partially support this option, it scores a medium likelihood. 
8.2.2. Stakeholder Acceptance – Public Acceptance 
While there are no polls specifically on the acceptance of this type of 
programming, potential public acceptance can be extrapolated by looking at overall 
public acceptance of affirmative action programs. Even though there are few polls on the 
subject, a QMI Agency poll in 2010 found that six in 10 Canadian’s say that a person’s 
race, gender, or ethnic background should not give a person an advantage when looking 
for a government job (Macleans, 2010). Given that that support in this poll was four in 10 
or 40% in favour of affirmative action and given that racial discrimination has become 
more of a concern in Canada, with a 2020 Ipsos Reid poll citing 60% of Canadians see 
racism as a serious problem in Canada (Ipsos Reid, 2020), this option scores a medium 
acceptance. 
8.2.3. Stakeholder Acceptance – Politician Acceptance  
According to the interviews conducted, local government politicians had mixed 
opinions on the idea of targeted civic engagement programs to raise the profile of visible 
minorities and provide them with meaningful governance and political experience. While 
all interviewees were in favour of these types of programs, issues arose with whether or 
not it was the government’s role to provide these opportunities, with two of four 
interviewees stating they did not believe it was the government’s responsibility to provide 
additional opportunities through specialized programs. Many felt that it was incumbent 
upon potential candidates or individual citizens to find and build that experience. 
Internships or a shadowing program for visible minority youth was the program that was 
supported the most, by all six interviewees, while there was a significant lack of support 
as to the increasing of committee seats or creating a citizen’s assembly specifically for 
visible minorities. While the interviewees highlighted that skepticism exists, politician 
support depends on the type of programming initiated. Therefore, given the potential 
variety of programming, this option scores medium acceptance, since all interviewees 
supported the internship program, but were hesitant to support increasing committee 
seats for visible minorities. 
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8.2.4. Administrative Complexity 
Regardless of the civic engagement program implemented, some form of 
additional management will be required. Should the municipality choose an internship 
program, a staff member will need to be designated to manage and monitor the 
program, and a recruitment and marketing plan will need to be created. Should the 
increase in committee spaces for visible minorities be implemented, committee 
composition regulations will need to be changed to accommodate the increase in seats, 
and the internal recruitment mandate will need to be enforced. If a citizen’s assembly is 
to be created, an act of council must be made to establish it, and there needs to be 
some sort of oversight to ensure that it is running appropriately. Therefore, regardless of 
the program implemented, the option requires city-level changes, with additional staff 
oversight, therefore the option scores medium complexity. 
8.3. Option 3: Civic Education – Educating candidate and 
electors through programming 
Effectiveness Stakeholder 
Acceptance – Public 
Acceptance 
Stakeholder 




Medium Likelihood (4) Medium Acceptance 
(2) 
High Acceptance (3) Low Complexity (3) 
 
8.3.1. Effectiveness 
Similar to option 2, option 3 is supported by one of the methods, while the other 
does not directly support it, as there is no specific policy in the jurisdictions, but lays the 
grounds for why its result could be effective. 
Again, the case studies do not directly support a civic education program, as 
none of the jurisdictions have civic education programs to analyze, however, using the 
voter turnout data, it can be inferred from the purpose of a civic education program that it 
would be effective should it be implemented. The case studies found that in election 
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years with higher voter turnout, local governments are more representative, than in 
years with lower voter turnout. 
In Chapter 2, prior research showed that ethnic voter bias exists and that electors 
are more likely to vote for a candidate who shares their ethnic background. The 
interviews support this idea. All six of the interviewees believed that low voter turnout 
negatively impacts diversity in city councils. All of the interviewees believed that the low 
turnout is caused by a lack of knowledge of the role of local governments. Four of the six 
interviewees believed that educating visible minorities about municipal government 
would increase voter turnout. One interviewee specifically said that they believed it 
would significantly increase representation of visible minorities on council, while the 
others said the other three said while it would increase representation, education alone 
would not significantly increase representation. Therefore, as it is directly supported by 
one research method, a civic education program scores a medium likelihood. 
8.3.2. Stakeholder Acceptance – Public Acceptance 
While there have been no polls conducted on civic education, there may be a 
portion of the electorate that feels that the city should be using its resources differently. 
Further, depending on the range of languages used in education and outreach material, 
there may be minor public pushback from individuals who are against visible minority 
groups using their traditional languages in communication. However, this pushback is 
expected to be minimal, therefore, while there are no signs of strong support, there is 
equally little opposition. For that reason, this option receives a medium acceptance 
score. 
8.3.3. Stakeholder Acceptance – Politician Acceptance 
According to the interviews conducted, no politician was against a public 
education campaign to better inform electors on the role of local governments. During 
the interview process, many local government politicians saw this as an opportunity to 
expand the education role they play and increase opportunities to interact with their 
constituents. For this reason, the option scores a high acceptance. 
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8.3.4. Administrative Complexity 
The complexity of this policy option varies depending on how robust and 
inclusive the education campaign is. If there is a creation the creation of a civic 
education program is taken, there needs to be a staff member to manage the program 
and conduct it. If the program is simply attending local community festivals, and creating 
new educational material, the complexity increases for each additional language that the 
material needs to be translated into. For cities that have non-homogenous visible 
minority communities who speak many languages besides English, that may require 
additional work, however, governments have experience in creating this kind of materials 
and translating them into different languages. Therefore, this option scores low 
complexity. 
8.4. Option 4: Status Quo 
Effectiveness Stakeholder Acceptance 
– Public Acceptance 
Stakeholder Acceptance 
– Politician Acceptance 
Administrative 
Complexity  
Low Likelihood (2) Medium Acceptance (2) High Acceptance (3) Low Complexity (3) 
 
8.4.1. Effectiveness 
None of the research methods directly supported the status quo. In the cases of 
the case studies, all of the jurisdictions were different from Metro Vancouver 
municipalities, and their success in electing representative local governments is a direct 
argument against the status quo in Metro Vancouver. In the instance of the interviews, 
all six interviewees stated that visible minority representation at the local government 
level is important, and the interviewees located in Metro Vancouver acknowledge that 
the status quo is problematic. As such, this option scores a low likelihood. 
The status quo, over time, has resulted in a long history of underrepresentation 
of visible minorities in Metro Vancouver municipal governments. Staying with the status 
quo does not provide a guarantee that more candidates will run, or that candidates will 
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get elected. Furthermore, there are still barriers present that adversely impact visible 
minority candidates (as discussed in section 5.2), such as the high burden of financing 
campaigns, time commitments and networks required to run successful campaigns, as 
well as combatting incumbent or previous experience bias, and party name recognition. 
8.4.2. Stakeholder Acceptance – Public Acceptance 
Citing the Insight’s West poll from Policy Option 1, outside of Surrey and 
Vancouver, 35% of Metro Vancouver respondents were opposed to switching from an 
at-large system to wards, while 41% were undecided (Insights West, 2014). In Surrey, 
those opposed to wards favouring the status quo accounted for 23% of respondents, 
with 34% undecided (Insights West, 2014). In Vancouver, 19% of respondents were in 
favour of the status quo, while 28% were undecided (Insights West, 2014). However, 
given the 2004 failed plebiscite in Vancouver for wards, with 54% opposed (City of 
Vancouver, n.d.), it can estimate that the undecided group is more likely to vote against 
changing the system. This would be in line with the other failed attempts at electoral 
reform in B.C., where voters decided to maintain the status quo. Therefore, factoring in 
the undecided as being more likely to vote in favour of keeping the status quo, this 
option scores medium acceptance, as overall it does not exceed the 60% threshold to 
qualify for high acceptance. 
8.4.3. Stakeholder Acceptance – Politician Acceptance 
At present, the status quo favours non-visible minority candidates and 
incumbents. Interviewees were not directly asked if they support the status quo, 
therefore, there is no number that can be used for this analysis. However, throughout the 
interviews, they all, in various combinations, found concerns with all potential policy 
options. This indicates an aversion to changing from the status quo. Furthermore, 
facilitating the improvement in candidate quality, or increase the potential that the ruling 
political elite may not hold onto elected power, is counter to their self-interest and is a 
primary driver as to why electoral reform or other policy changes often do not occur. 
Self-interested politicians, once they attain power, do not want to change the rules of the 
game if it will serve to disadvantage them in the future. Therefore, for this reason, 
maintain the status quo receives a score of high acceptance. 
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8.4.4. Administrative Complexity 
As no changes would be required when keeping the status quo, this option 
scores low complexity. 
Table 17  Summary of Policy Analysis 













































































Chapter 9. Recommendations and Conclusion 
As can be seen in Table 17, all the options have their advantages and 
disadvantages. Based on the analysis in Chapter 8, education seems to be the best 
option to implement, scoring the highest. It is the least complex to implement, and the 
most widely accepted option by local government politicians. As the interviewees 
indicated, a lack of knowledge on the role of local government negatively impacts voter 
turnout, and as shown by the case study analysis, in the election years with higher voter 
turnout, visible minority representation increased. This is due to the presence of ethnic 
voter bias, as seen in Chapter 2. Expanding the portion of the electorate who actively 
vote, can lead to a government that is more representative of that electorate. However, 
as pointed out by the interviewees, education alone may not be the most effective 
solution to the problem. Therefore, due to the minimal complexity of implementing an 
education program, this research recommends another option along with an education 
program. While all other options analyzed scored the same as the status quo, given the 
status quo is the least effective option at increasing visible minority representation 
options that are deemed to be more effective should be considered. 
The second recommendation from this research is the adoption of a suite of civic 
engagement programs meant to increase the profile of potential future visible minority 
candidates and provide visible minorities with governance experience. As can be seen 
by the analysis in the case studies and Chapter 2, incumbents and those with prior 
governance experience hold an advantage in electoral contests due to their name 
recognition and experience. While levels of support varied depending on the type of 
program, internships or shadowing programs for visible minorities, especially youth, 
proved to be amongst the most popular. However, other options such as expanding 
committee membership to include more visible minorities should be considered at the 
discretion of the implementing municipalities. 
Finally, although the first option of wards is not being recommended due to its 
complexity and being least supported by the public overall, this option should be 
considered and further evaluated by the larger municipalities in Metro Vancouver. Given 
that wards were deemed to be the most effective option, each municipality should 
determine if wards are appropriate for their context. If we look at public approval of 
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wards in the large municipalities, we see higher rates of acceptance in the large 
municipalities, especially in Surrey and Vancouver, than in smaller municipalities. 
Although interviewees from the at-large jurisdiction raised other concerns over wards, 
such as political polarization from Councillors only advocating for their constituents, 
alternatives such as a mixed ward and at-large system, as seen in Seattle, is a viable 
alternative. 
Given that this area of research is fairly new in B.C., and due to the limitations of 
this research, there is a need for further study on the effects and impacts of parties and 
slates, and campaign financing on visible minorities in local government elections. 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 5 touched on the important role of parties and slates in helping 
support candidates, as well as the barriers that lack of finances play in the electability of 
candidates. It is clear that policies could be implemented to help overcome these, 
however, the extent of the impact and what could feasibly be done needs further 
analysis than was capable in this capstone. Another area of further study that should be 
conducted is the rate of voter turnout among visible minorities in Metro Vancouver. While 
the Chapter 2 and 5 touched on the idea of low voter turnout occurring amongst visible 
minorities, no concrete data could be found in the case of Metro Vancouver. Therefore, a 
study to determine the extent of low visible minority voter turnout would be helpful in 
informing future policy action and determine the effectiveness of any policies meant to 
increase voter turnout among visible minorities. Finally, while this research focused 
generally on Metro Vancouver, the city of Richmond presents an interesting case worth 
further study. Studies and media coverage in British Columbia tend to focus on 
Vancouver or Surrey, however Richmond has the largest proportion of visible minorities 
in Metro Vancouver (75.65% of the total population is visible minority), and it has the 
largest representation gap of all the observed municipalities (53.43 percentage points).  
Representation in government is clearly important. Descriptive representation 
leads to a greater sense of fairness amongst the electorate in decision-making and 
increases empowerment amongst visible minorities who are better represented. But 
more importantly, having a representative government minimizes the risks of having the 
voices of minorities left out of the discussion. All of the interviewees stressed the 
importance of visible minorities being represented in local governments, and if the 
current system in Metro Vancouver is delivering underrepresentation, government needs 
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to take action. Through education and civic engagement opportunities, electing a diverse 
city becomes a possibility without having to overhaul the nature of our current system. 
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Table A.1  Impact of Incumbency and Previous Governance Experience on 
Winning in the 2018 City Councillor Elections of the Seven Largest 
















































Surrey 8 48 6 1 16.67% 16.67% 
Vancouver 10 71 14 5 35.71% 8.77% 
Richmond 8 30 10 6 60% 10% 
Burnaby 8 23 9 7 77.78% 14.29% 
Coquitlam 8 19 6 6 100% 15.38% 
Delta 6 20 4 3 75% 18.75% 
Township 
of Langley 
8 23 10 6 60% 15.38% 
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Table A.2  Impact of Incumbency and Previous Governance Experience on 
Winning in the 2018 Mayoral Elections of the Seven Largest 
Municipalities in Metro Vancouver 
City Total Number of 
Candidates 
Number of Candidates 
with Previous 
Governance Experience 
(including at different 
levels of government 
and incumbents) 




Surrey 8 3 Yes 
Vancouver 21 5 Yes 
Richmond 6 2 Yes 
Burnaby 4 2 No 
Coquitlam 3 1 Yes 
Delta 6 1 No 
Township of Langley 3 1 Yes 
 
City of Surrey 
Of the eight mayoral candidates, three of the candidates had prior experience 
with one having previously served as Mayor, and two having previously served as City 
Councillors. Of note, these three candidates received the three highest shares of votes 
(41.1%, 25.7%, and 25.3%). Of the eight City Councillor winners, one had previous 
experience, previously serving as a member of the provincial Legislative Assembly. This 
candidate also received the highest vote share percentage of all candidates with 36.5%. 
Of the 48 city council candidates, six had prior experience, and placed 1st, 10th, 11th, 16th, 
17th, and 24th, receiving 36.5%, 24.8%, 24.3%, 23.4%, 23.3%, and 8% of the vote share, 
respectively. 
City of Vancouver  
Of the 21 mayoral candidates, five candidates had prior experience. The winner 
had previously served as a Member of Parliament. The other candidates with experience 
placed 4th, 5th, 7th, and 9th, receiving 6.7%, 5.6%, 2%, and 0.8% of the total vote 
share, respectively. Of the 10 elected City Councillors, five had previous experience (two 
having been incumbents, and three having served in other public offices. Of all 71 City 
Councillor candidates, 14 of the candidates had prior experience. These candidates 
placed 1st, 3rd, 6th, 8th, 10th, 13th, 16th, 19th, 22nd, 23rd, 29th, 44th, 49th, 61st, 
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receiving 39.5%, 30.2%, 26.9%, 25.3%, 24.7%, 22.4%, 20.7%, 16.7%, 14.2%, 13.2%, 
8.7%, 6.5%, 4.6%, and 2.4%. 
City of Richmond 
Of the six mayoral candidates, two candidates had prior experience. The winner 
was the incumbent and received 62.9% of the vote, while the other candidate placed 3rd 
and received 8.7% of the vote. Of the eight elected City Councillors, six were 
incumbents. Of the 30 city council candidates, 10 had prior experience, and placed 1st, 
2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 12th, and 13th, receiving 43.1%, 39.5%, 37.2%, 35.6%, 
32.1%, 27.3%, 27.1%, 25.5%, 23.1%, and 23% of the vote share, respectively. 
City of Burnaby 
Of the four mayoral candidates, two had prior experience, one being the 
incumbent (placing 2nd, with 40.7% of the vote) and one having served at another level 
of government (placing 3rd and receiving 4.4% of the vote). Of the eight elected City 
Councillors, seven had prior experience, all being incumbents. Of the 23 City Councillor 
candidates, nine had prior experience. These candidates placed 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 
7th, 9th, and 12th, receiving 39.9%, 39.4%, 39.3%, 37.6%, 35.7%, 33.5%, 32%, 31.1% 
and 26.6% of the vote share, respectively. 
City of Coquitlam 
Of the three mayoral candidates, only one had prior experience as the 
incumbent, who won with 68.7% of the total vote share. Of the eight elected City 
Councillors, six had prior experience as incumbents. These six were also the only 
candidates out of the 19 candidates with previous experience. These six placed 1st, 2nd, 
3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th, receiving 60%, 59.7%, 51.9%, 51.1%, 44.4% and 44.3% of the total 
vote share, respectively. 
City of Delta 
Of the six mayoral candidates, only one had prior experience, having served at a 
different level of government. The candidate placed 3rd, receiving 23.4% of the share of 
total votes. Of the six elected City Councillors, three had prior experience, with one 
having served at a different level of government and two being incumbents. Of the 20 
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City Councillors, four had prior experience, and placed 2nd, 4th, 5th, and 10th, receiving 
44.6%, 42.1%, 38.1%, and 26.6% of the total vote share, respectively. 
Township of Langley 
Of the three mayoral candidates, only one had previous experience. Serving as 
the incumbent, this candidate won the election with 57.7% of the total vote share. Of the 
eight elected City Councillors, six had prior experience, with five being incumbents, and 
one having previously served as a City Councillor. Of the 23 city council candidates, 10 
had prior experience. Those with prior experience placed 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 9th, 
11th, 13th, and 17th, receiving 46.7%, 38.9%, 36.9%, 35.8%, 35.6%, 33.9%, 32.8%, 
30.8%, 28%, and 20.6% of the vote, respectively. 
 
 
